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1 Introduction
The important and influential literature growing out of Mirrlees’ (1971) seminal paper on
optimal income taxation has stressed the trade-offs between incentive and distributional
considerations in the design of income tax schedules. These trade-offs arise from an
information friction that endogenizes the feasible tax instruments: the government knows
the distribution of types in the population and it can also observe the actual earned
income of each individual, but is not able to observe the specific type of any given
individual. Personalized lump-sum taxes and transfers are therefore not available but
public observability of earned income at the individual level allows the government to tax
earned income on a nonlinear scale.
The vast majority of papers in the optimal tax literature assume that agents differ
along a single dimension (market ability). This is due to tractability considerations.
Given certain assumptions on the utility function, it enables a monotonic relationship
between an agent’s unobserved type and the slope of his/her indifference curve in the
earnings-consumption space. This property, referred to as ’single-crossing’ (hereafter,
SC), allows the researcher to provide a full characterization of the set of implementable
contracts while restricting attention to local incentive constraints linking adjacent types.
In the case of a continuum of types, it also implies that the incentive constraints can
conveniently be expressed in terms of differential equations. When agents differ along
multiple dimensions, however, the SC property will generally be violated, as there is no
natural way to order agents in a multidimensional space.1
A comparatively small literature analyzes optimal income taxation with multidimen-
sional unobserved heterogeneity, and these contributions can roughly be divided into four
strands. A first strand assumes that the additional dimensions of heterogeneity enters
additively separable in the utility function, thereby not affecting individuals’ trade-offs
between pre-tax and after-tax income (see e.g., Kleven et al., 2009; Jacquet et al., 2013;
Scheuer, 2014; Bastani et al., 2020). A second strand imposes restrictions such that the
various dimensions of heterogeneity can be collapsed into one dimension and parame-
terized by a single index (see, e.g., Boadway et al.; 2002; Chone´ and Laroque, 2010;
Golosov et al., 2013; Rothschild and Scheuer, 2014; Lockwood and Weinzierl, 2015).
A third strand analyzes more general forms of heterogeneity, but focuses attention to
quantitative analysis of models with a small discrete number of types (see, e.g., Bastani
et al., 2013; Judd et al., 2018). Finally, a fourth strand comprises papers that provide
1Multidimensional heterogeneity is however not a necessary condition to generate violation of SC.
See, for instance, Gahvari (2007) and Ho and Pavoni (2020).
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a characterization of optimal marginal tax rates while remaining agnostic about which
incentive-compatibility constraints are binding in equilibrium (see, e.g., Cremer et al.,
1998; Cremer and Gahvari, 2002; Micheletto, 2008).
Compared to the existing literature referred to above, the purpose of this paper is to
provide a more thorough investigation of the consequences descending from abandoning
the SC condition. For this purpose, we set up a simple two-type model where the SC
condition is naturally violated, and we characterize the properties of a second-best opti-
mum by considering the entire second-best Pareto frontier (hereafter, PF).2 The model
that we consider is a standard intensive-margin optimal income tax model where agents
have identical preferences and heterogeneous market abilities, but where we also allow for
heterogeneity in “needs” for a work-related good/service, i.e. a good/service that some
agents need to purchase in order to work.3 It is this bi-dimensional heterogeneity that
implies a violation of the SC condition.
Our analysis highlights several results, each of them representing an anomaly with
respect to what is obtained in an optimal income tax model under SC. First of all, a
second-best optimum might not preserve the ranking of earned income that prevails under
laissez-faire. Second, redistribution via income taxation might be feasible even when the
laissez-faire equilibrium is a pooling equilibrium. Third, a second-best optimum might
not be unique, in the sense that there might be more than one set of allocations in
the (pre-tax income, after-tax income)-space that solve the government’s maximization
problem. Fourth, the second-best PF can be disconnected. Fifth, supplementing an
optimal nonlinear income tax with an optimal subsidy on work-related expenses may
imply that redistribution is achieved through a separating- or pooling equilibrium where
both self-selection constraints are binding. A final result that we show is that the labor
supply of some agents may be distorted even though no self-selection constraint is (locally)
binding in equilibrium.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present our setting and highlight how
it implies that the SC condition does not hold. In Section 3 we evaluate the properties of
the second-best PF and of the allocations that allow implementing the various points on
the second-best PF. To simplify the exposition we make the assumption that, for agents
who incur a cost for the purchase of a work-related good, the cost is proportional to their
2A similar exercise has been undertaken by Bierbrauer and Boyer (2014) for a two-type optimal
nonlinear income tax model where individuals have linear effort costs and the SC-condition holds.
3Several interpretations are possible. One example is child care services which are needed by parents
of young kids in order to work. Other groups who might face needs constraints include workers with
relatives who require elderly care, or workers who incur commuting costs or work-related health costs.
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labor supply. In section 4 we discuss how our results change when work-related expenses
are subsidized by the government, and in Section 5 we briefly consider the possibility
that job-related expenses vary nonlinearly with hours of work. Finally, section 6 offers
concluding remarks.
2 The model
Consider an economy populated by two groups of individuals who have identical prefer-
ences represented by the quasi-linear utility function
U = c− 1
2
h2, (1)
where c denotes consumption and h denotes labor supply.4
The two groups of agents are assumed to differ with respect to their market ability,
reflected in their hourly wage rate, and their needs for a work-related good. One group
has no need for any work-related good, whereas agents belonging to the other group incur
a monetary cost ϕ(h) = qh, where q is a positive constant. Throughout the paper we will
refer to these groups of agents as “non-users” and “users”, and denote their hourly wage
rates by, respectively, wn and wu (superscript “n” referring to non-users, and superscript
“u” referring to users). Moreover, normalizing to 1 the size of the total population, we
will denote by pi the proportion of users. Furthermore, we will assume that wu > wn,
implying that the high-skilled agents are disadvantaged along our second dimension of
heterogeneity, and that q < wu which ensures that the labor supply of users is strictly
positive under laissez-faire.
Assume that the government levies a nonlinear income tax T (wh) and let earned
income be denoted by Y (i.e., Y ≡ wh) and after-tax income be denoted by B (i.e.,
B ≡ Y − T (Y )). It is straightforward to verify that the SC property is not satisfied in
our two-type economy. This property requires that, at any bundle in the (Y,B)-space,
the indifference curves are flatter the higher the wage rate of an agent. In our model, and
for a given (Y,B)-bundle, users and non-users have utilities that are respectively given
by:
Uu = B − q Y
wu
− 1
2
(
Y
wu
)2
,
Un = B − 1
2
(
Y
wn
)2
.
4The specific iso-elastic form of the utility function is here mainly adopted for analytical convenience.
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Therefore, at a given (Y,B)-bundle, the slope of a user’s indifference curve is equal to
MRSuY B (Y,B) ≡ −
∂Uu/∂Y
∂Uu/∂B
=
1
wu
[
q +
Y
wu
]
, (2)
whereas non-users have an indifference curve with slope equal to
MRSnY B (Y,B) ≡ −
∂Un/∂Y
∂Un/∂B
=
Y
(wn)2
. (3)
From (2) and (3), it follows that users and non-users have equally sloped indifference
curves at bundles where
Y =
q
wu
[
1
(wn)2
− 1
(wu)2
]−1
=
qwu
(wu)2 − (wn)2 (w
n)2 ≡ Ω > 0, (4)
whereas at any bundle where Y > (<) Ω, users have flatter (steeper) indifference curves
than non-users.
The fact that the SC property is not satisfied shows that our bi-dimensional hetero-
geneity (in skills and needs) cannot be reduced to one dimension. Albeit this complicates
the analysis, it also allows us to highlight some interesting results that can arise due to
the violation of SC.
In the next section we will evaluate the properties of the second-best PF and of
the allocations that allow implementing the various points on the second-best PF. In
doing that, we will restrict our attention to the case when pi, the proportion of users, is
lower than 1− (wn)2 / (wu)2; this represents the most interesting case for the purpose of
illustrating the anomalies that can arise due to the violation of SC.5
Before turning to the analysis of the second-best PF, however, we will devote the
remainder of this section to first provide a characterization of the laissez-faire equilibrium,
and then characterize the properties of the first-best PF.
2.1 The laissez-faire equilibrium
Under laissez-faire, users choose h to maximize (wu − q)h− h2/2, implying hu = wu− q,
whereas non-users choose h to maximize wnh− h2/2, implying hn = wn.
Therefore, denoting by Y iLF the laissez-faire income of an individual i, for i = n, u, we
have that Y nLF = (w
n)2, Y uLF = (w
u − q)wu. It then follows that
Y uLF < (>)Y
n
LF ⇐⇒ (wu − q)wu < (>) (wn)2 .
5In a background version of the paper we also consider the case where pi ≥ 1 − (wn)2 / (wu)2. See
Bastani et al. (2019).
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Equivalently, defining q as
q ≡ (w
u)2 − (wn)2
wu
,
we have that
Y uLF < (>)Y
n
LF ⇐⇒ q > (<) q.
Consider the case when q > q, so that Y uLF < Y
n
LF . Since Ω in (4) can be re-expressed
as (wn)2 q/q, it also follows that Ω > Y nLF when q > q. Similarly, when q < q, we have
that Ω < Y nLF , and when q = q we have that Ω = Y
n
LF . Thus, whether q is smaller than,
equal to, or larger than q also determines the relative sizes of both types’ MRS at their
laissez-faire bundles (i.e. the relations between Y uLF , Y
n
LF and the threshold Ω).
The following Lemma summarizes the relationship between the value of q and the
three possible configurations of a laissez-faire equilibrium.
Lemma 1 Assume that wu > wn.
(i) When q < q, the laissez-faire equilibrium will be such that Y uLF > Y
n
LF > Ω;
(ii) When q = q, the laissez-faire equilibrium will be such that Y uLF = Y
n
LF = Ω;
(iii) When q > q, the laissez-faire equilibrium will be such that Y uLF < Y
n
LF < Ω.
A graphical illustration of the laissez-faire equilibrium for the case when q > q, and
of the violation of SC, is provided in Figure 1 below.
Regarding utilities, denoting by U iLF the laissez-faire utility of an individual i, for
i = n, u, we have that UuLF = (w
u − q)2 /2, UnLF = (wn)2 /2, and therefore
UuLF < (>)U
n
LF ⇐⇒ wu − q < (>)wn,
or, equivalently
UuLF < (>)U
n
LF ⇐⇒ q > (<)wu − wn.
One thing to notice is that the utility ranking and the income ranking may differ. In
particular, while Y uLF ≤ Y nLF implies that UuLF < UnLF , knowing that Y uLF > Y nLF is not
sufficient to establish who is better off under laissez faire. When Y uLF > Y
n
LF , we can
have that UuLF < U
n
LF (when (w
u − q)wu > (wn)2 > (wu − q)2), UuLF = UnLF (when
(wu − q)wu > (wn)2 = (wu − q)2), or UuLF > UnLF (when (wu − q)wu > (wu − q)2 >
(wn)2).
2.2 The shape of the first-best Pareto frontier
In a first-best setting where asymmetric information is not an issue, the shape of the PF
can be straightforwardly characterized. The first-best PF goes through the point with
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Figure 1
coordinates (UnLF , U
u
LF ) and has slope dU
u/dUn = −(1− pi)/pi for values of Un such that
− (wn)2 /2 ≤ Un ≤ [(wu − q)2 pi/ (1− pi)]+ (wn)2 /2. For Un > [(wu − q)2 pi/ (1− pi)]+
(wn)2 /2 the slope of the PF is such that dUu/dUn < −(1 − pi)/pi; for Un < − (wn)2 /2
the slope is such that −(1− pi)/pi < dUu/dUn < 0.
The intuition is as follows. Starting from the laissez-faire equilibrium, a 1$ lump-
sum tax levied on non-users, which reduces by 1 the utility of each non-user, allows the
government to collect $(1 − pi), which implies that each user can receive a lump-sum
transfer of $(1− pi) /pi, raising utility by (1− pi) /pi. This kind of income- and utility-
redistribution, from non-users to users, can go on until all the income earned by non-users
under laissez-faire, i.e. (wn)2, is confiscated by the government. At that point we have
that Un = − (wn)2 /2 (consumption for non-users is equal to zero and, with no income
effects on labor supply, their labor supply is undistorted at its laissez-faire level) and
Uu =
[
(wn)2 (1− pi) /pi] + (wu − q)2 /2. Once this point on the first-best PF is reached,
and assuming that zero represents the lower bound for individual consumption,6 a further
6One can think that individual consumption cannot fall below a subsistence level c. From this
perspective, assuming that c = 0 is simply a matter of normalization.
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increase in Uu can only be obtained by pushing the labor supply of non-users above its
undistorted level hn = wn (while keeping at zero their consumption), so that additional
resources can be transferred to users. However, due to the distortion on the labor supply
of non-users, redistribution becomes costlier and the slope of the PF becomes equal to
dUu/dUn = − (1− pi)wn/pihn, which is greater than −(1 − pi)/pi when hn exceeds wn,
i.e. its laissez-faire value.7
The fact that the non-negativity constraint on consumption becomes binding along
some portions of the first-best PF, and consequently the fact that there are portions
of the first-best PF where the labor supply of some agents is upward distorted, is an
artifact of our assumption that utility is linear in consumption.8 Most importantly, it
has nothing to do with the fact that the SC property does not hold in our model. For
this reason, in our analysis we will hereafter impose the following lower bounds on the
utility of, respectively, non-users and users:
Un ≥ −UnLF = − (wn)2 /2, (5)
Uu ≥ −UuLF = − (wu − q)2 /2. (6)
Conditions (5) and (6) ensure that, at each point along the relevant part of the first-
best PF, the labor supply of all agents will be left undistorted.
3 Pareto efficient income taxation
Consider now a second-best setting with asymmetric information. Specifically, assume
that the government knows the distribution of types in the population but does not know
“who is who”. Albeit individual wages, hours of work and job-related expenses are not
observed by the government, earned income is assumed to be publicly observable at an
individual level. This allows earned income to be taxed on a nonlinear scale and the
government’s problem consists in optimally choosing the nonlinear income tax T (Y ).
Notice however that, while T (Y ) defines a link between earned income Y and after-tax
7A similar reasoning can be adopted to show that the slope of the first-best PF is equal to −(1−pi)/pi
for values of Un > UnLF and such that (w
n)
2
/2 < Un ≤
[
(wu − q)2 pi/ (1− pi)
]
+ (wn)
2
/2. When
Un =
[
(wu − q)2 pi/ (1− pi)
]
+ (wn)
2
/2, all the resources available for consumption by users under
laissez-faire have been transferred to non-users. Since consumption for users has then reached its lower
bound, a further increase in the utility of non-users can only be obtained by requiring users to increase
their labor supply, while keeping at zero their consumption, so that additional resources can be transferred
to non-users. However, since the required increase in hu entails a distortion on the labor supply of users,
redistribution becomes costlier and the slope of the PF becomes dUu/dUn = − (1− pi)hu/pi (wu − q),
which is lower than −(1− pi)/pi when hu exceeds wu − q, i.e. its laissez-faire value.
8The non-negativity constraint on consumption could be safely disregarded if the marginal utility of
consumption goes to infinity as consumption approaches zero.
8
income B which is a single-valued function, the link that it establishes between earned
income and consumption is a multivalued function. This is because, for given Y and
corresponding tax payment T (Y ), an individual consumption depends on the amount of
job-related expenses.
As customary in the optimal tax literature, we will adopt a mechanism design ap-
proach assuming that the government optimally chooses two bundles in the (Y,B)-space
subject to the requirement that the chosen set of bundles satisfies public-budget balance,
incentive-compatibility, and non-negativity constraints on both consumption and labor
supply. Denoting by (Y u, Bu) the bundle intended for users and by (Y n, Bn) the one
intended for non-users, a Pareto efficient tax problem can be formalized as follows:
max
Y u,Bu,Y n,Bn
Bu − q
wu
Y u − 1
2
(
Y u
wu
)2
subject to:
Bn − 1
2
(
Y n
wn
)2
≥ V n, (ν)
(Y u −Bu) pi + (Y n −Bn) (1− pi) ≥ 0, (µ)
Bn − 1
2
(
Y n
wn
)2
≥ Bu − 1
2
(
Y u
wn
)2
, (λ)
Bu − q
wu
Y u − 1
2
(
Y u
wu
)2
≥ Bn − q
wu
Y n − 1
2
(
Y n
wu
)2
, (φ)
Y u ≥ 0, Y n ≥ 0, Bn ≥ 0, Bu − qY u/wu ≥ 0.
In the problem above, the ν-constraint prescribes a lower bound V
n
for the utility of
non-users, the µ-constraint represents the government’s budget constraint (the resource
constraint of the economy), the λ-constraint is the self-selection constraint requiring non-
users not to be tempted to choose the bundle intended for users, and the φ-constraint is the
self-selection constraint requiring users not to be tempted to choose the bundle intended
for non-users. For a given value of V
n
, we define the set of admissible bundles as the
set of bundles {(Y u, Bu), (Y n, Bn)} satisfying the constraints in the above optimization
problem (including the non-negativity constraints on labor supply and consumption for
each agent). For given values of pi, q, wu and wn, the value function of the optimization
problem above defines a value for Uu which is a function of V
n
, that can be written as
UuSB
(
V
n)
. Repeatedly solving the optimization problem for different values of V
n
allows
tracing the entire second-best PF. In particular, we have that:
Definition 1 The second-best Pareto-frontier is defined by the graph of the function
UuSB
(
V
n)
over the domain of values V
n
such that the set of admissible bundles is non-
empty and the ν-constraint is binding.
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We will present our results by means of three Propositions which separately consider
the three cases described in Lemma 1 above. In each Proposition we will denote by
T ′ (Y uSB) and T
′ (Y nSB) the marginal income tax rate faced by, respectively, users and non-
users at the allocation which allows implementing a given point on the second-best PF.
As customary in the optimal tax literature, the marginal income tax rate faced by an
individual at a given bundle in the (Y,B)-space is defined as 1−MRSY B.
As we will see, the non-standard outcomes which are due to the violation of SC only
arise when q ≥ q. For this reason, discussing the results when q < q can be regarded as
a useful starting point. Proposition 1 summarizes the main findings for this case.
Proposition 1 Assume that 0 < q < q, so that Y nLF < Y
u
LF . Then,
i) the domain of the function UuSB
(
V
n)
describing the second-best PF is given by
V
n ∈ [−UnLF , UnLF + pi2
(Y uLF−Y nLF )2
(wu)2−pi(wn)2 ];
ii) for UnLF − pi2
(Y uLF−Y nLF )2
(wn)2
≤ V n ≤ UnLF + pi2
(Y uLF−Y nLF )2
(wu)2
, the second-best PF coincides
with the first-best PF and it is attained through an allocation where T ′ (Y nSB) =
T ′ (Y uSB) = 0;
iii) for UnLF +
pi
2
(Y uLF−Y nLF )2
(wu)2
< V
n ≤ UnLF + pi2
(Y uLF−Y nLF )2
(wu)2−pi(wn)2 , the second-best PF is attained
through an allocation where T ′ (Y uSB) = 0 and T
′ (Y nSB) > 0;
iv) for −UnLF ≤ V
n
< UnLF − pi2
(Y uLF−Y nLF )2
(wn)2
, the second-best PF is attained through an
allocation where T ′ (Y nSB) = 0 and T
′ (Y uSB) < 0.
Proof. See Appendix A
The results provided in Proposition 1 are qualitatively similar to those that would be
obtained in a standard two-type setting where agents only differ in market ability (q = 0).
Part ii) shows that when the amount of inter-group redistribution is sufficiently
small (i.e., V
n
is sufficiently close to UnLF ), no distortion is needed to satisfy incentive-
compatibility; this means that asymmetric information does not prevent the government
from attaining a point on the first-best PF.
Together, parts iii) and iv) show instead that, when the amount of redistribution
becomes sufficiently large, incentive-compatibility considerations require to distort the
labor supply of the transfer-recipients. When these are represented by non-users, as in
part iii) of Proposition 1, their labor supply will be downward distorted by letting them
face a positive marginal tax rate. When transfer-recipients are instead represented by
users, as in part iv), their labor supply will be upward distorted by letting them face a
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negative marginal tax rate. In either case, since Proposition 1 refers to the case when
Y nLF < Y
u
LF , the direction of the distortion imposed on the labor supply of the transfer-
recipients is always “coherent” with the income ranking prevailing under laissez-faire.
Thus, when q < q, the laissez-faire income-ranking is preserved at all points on the
second-best PF.
Let’s now consider the case when q = q.
Proposition 2 Assume that q = q, so that Y nLF = Y
u
LF . Then,
i) the domain of the function UuSB
(
V
n)
describing the second-best PF is given by
V
n ∈ [−UnLF , UnLF ];
ii) for (1 − pi)UnLF ≤ V
n
< UnLF , the second-best PF can be attained through two
different allocations, one where T ′ (Y nSB) = 0 and T
′ (Y uSB) < 0, and another one
where T ′ (Y nSB) = 0 and T
′ (Y uSB) > 0;
iii) for −UnLF ≤ V
n
< (1− pi)UnLF , the second-best PF is attained through an allocation
where T ′ (Y nSB) = 0 and T
′ (Y uSB) < 0.
Proof. See Appendix B.
A key insight to understand the properties of the PF when q = q is that the indifference
curve on which non-users locate under laissez-faire lies everywhere above the indifference
curve on which users locate under laissez-faire (except at the point Y nLF = Y
u
LF where the
two indifference curves are tangent). This is illustrated in Figure 2.
According to Proposition 2, the government can use a nonlinear income tax to redis-
tribute towards users even in cases when both types earn the same income under laissez-
faire. This stands in contrast to models where the SC holds; under SC, an anonymous
nonlinear income tax does not allow the government to convert a pooling laissez-faire
equilibrium into a separating equilibrium. However, as shown in part ii), the labor sup-
ply of users is always distorted for V
n
< UnLF , which shows that the λ-constraint is
binding for any degree of redistribution from non-users to users.
The indifference curves represented in Figure 2 are helpful to get an intuition for the
result that redistribution towards users is feasible. Suppose in fact that non-users were
offered an undistorted bundle on an indifference curve that is below the one on which they
locate under laissez-faire. Looking at Figure 2 it is easy to realize that a downward shift
in the indifference curve of non-users would allow to find a set of bundles that are at the
same time above the users’ laissez-faire indifference curve and below the downward shifted
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Figure 2
indifference curve of non-users. This means that, starting from the equilibrium described
in Figure 2, it is feasible to move non-users on a lower indifference curve without violating
the incentive-compatibility constraint requiring them not to be tempted to mimic users
(the λ-constraint).
According to part ii) of Proposition 2, for each V
n ∈ [(1 − pi)UnLF , UnLF ) the corre-
sponding point on the second-best PF can be achieved through two different allocations.
The two allocations are equivalent in the sense that they induce the same utility dis-
tribution. Although at both allocations non-users get the same (Y,B)-bundle and face
no distortion on their labor supply (T ′ (Y nSB) = 0 and Y
n
SB = Y
n
LF ), one implementing
allocation entails a downward distortion on the labor supply of users (T ′ (Y uSB) > 0 and
Y uSB < Y
u
LF ), whereas the other implementing allocation entails an upward distortion on
their labor supply (T ′ (Y uSB) < 0 and Y
u
SB < Y
u
LF ). Intuitively, the reason why there are
two different allocations that allow achieving the same point on the second-best PF is
that, with q = q, the magnitude of the distortion on users’ labor supply, that is needed
to deter mimicking by non-users, is the same independently on its direction.
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According to part iii), for V
n
< (1 − pi)UnLF , a point on the second-best PF always
requires that the labor supply of users is upward distorted (T ′ (Y uSB) < 0). To understand
why this is the case, consider the point on the second-best PF that corresponds to V
n
=
(1 − pi)UnLF . Of the two allocations that allow implementing this point, the allocation
entailing a downward distortion on the labor supply of users prescribes to offer them the
bundle (Y,B) = (0, (1− pi)UnLF ). At this bundle their labor supply is pushed to its lower
bound. Given that incentive-compatibility (the λ-constraint) requires that a reduction in
V
n
is accompanied by a larger (in absolute value) distortion on users, it follows that once
V
n
has reached (1− pi)UnLF , a further reduction cannot be accommodated by magnifying
the downward distortion on the labor supply of users. Therefore, for V
n
< (1 − pi)UnLF ,
the implementing allocation becomes unique and it requires to distort upwards the users’
labor supply.
Finally, Proposition 2 shows that when the two types are pooled at the laissez-faire
equilibrium, it is never possible to use a nonlinear income tax to redistribute from users
to non-users, i.e. there is no point on the second-best PF where non-users get a utility
higher than UnLF . An intuition for this result can again be grasped by looking at the
indifference curves depicted in Figure 2. Given that the laissez-faire indifference curve
of users lies everywhere below the laissez-faire indifference curve of non-users (except at
Y uLF = Y
n
LF where they are tangent), it is impossible to move users on a lower indifference
curve without violating the incentive-compatibility constraint requiring them not to be
tempted to mimic non-users (the φ-constraint). Taking into account that, as previously
noticed, for V
n
< UnLF the labor supply of users is always distorted, it also follows that
when the laissez-faire equilibrium features pooling, the first-best- and the second-best PF
share only one point, i.e. the laissez-faire utility distribution.
Let’s now move to the last case that is left to consider, i.e. the case when q > q.
Proposition 3 Assume that q > q, so that Y nLF > Y
u
LF . Then,
i) when q < q
√
2+
√
pi
2
√
pi
− (
√
2−√pi)√piwu
2
, the second-best PF is disconnected and the domain
of the function UuSB
(
V
n)
is given by
V
n ∈ [−UnLF , (1− pi)UnLF − δ) ∪
[
(1− pi)UnLF , V nmax
]
,
where δ > 0 and V
n
max > U
n
LF +
pi
2
(Y uLF−Y nLF )2
(wu)2
; when q ≥ q
√
2+
√
pi
2
√
pi
− (
√
2−√pi)√piwu
2
, the
domain is instead given by
V
n ∈ [(1− pi)UnLF , V nmax] ;
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ii) for UnLF − pi2
(Y uLF−Y nLF )2
(wn)2
≤ V n ≤ UnLF + pi2
(Y uLF−Y nLF )2
(wu)2
, the second-best PF coincides
with the first-best PF and any point on the frontier is attained through an allocation
where T ′ (Y nSB) = T
′ (Y uSB) = 0;
iii) for UnLF +
pi
2
(Y uLF−Y nLF )2
(wu)2
< V
n ≤ V nmax, any point on the second-best PF corresponds
to an allocation at which T ′ (Y uSB) = 0 and T
′ (Y nSB) < 0;
iv) for (1− pi)UnLF ≤ V
n
< UnLF − pi2
(Y uLF−Y nLF )2
(wn)2
, any point on the second-best PF corre-
sponds to an allocation at which T ′ (Y nSB) = 0 and T
′ (Y uSB) > 0;
v) when the second-best PF includes a region where −UnLF ≤ V
n
< (1 − pi)UnLF ,
any point on that region corresponds to an allocation at which T ′ (Y nSB) = 0 and
T ′ (Y uSB) < 0.
Proof. See Appendix C.
Qualitatively, some of the results provided in Proposition 3 are standard. For instance,
according to part ii), no distortion is needed to satisfy incentive-compatibility when the
amount of inter-group redistribution is sufficiently small (i.e., for values of V
n
sufficiently
close to UnLF ). Another standard result is represented by part iii) which states that,
for V
n
> UnLF , if incentive-compatibility considerations require to distort the bundle
offered to the transfer-recipients (in this case, non-users), the direction of the distortion
is “coherent” with the income ranking under laissez-faire.
Two results stand out instead as non-standard and are specifically due to the violation
of the SC condition. The first, stated in part i), highlights the possibility that the
second-best PF is disconnected. The second, which is a consequence of parts iv) and v),
highlights that moving along the portion of the second-best PF where V
n
< UnLF , the
sign of T ′ (Y uSB) may change. In particular, despite the fact that Y
n
LF > Y
u
LF , users do
not necessarily face a downward distortion on their labor supply at all points on the PF
where the λ-constraint is binding, i.e. at all points where the labor supply of users needs
to be distorted to prevent mimicking by non-users.
These two results are strictly related due to the fact that the sign of T ′ (Y uSB) is
not everywhere non-negative if and only if the domain of the function UuSB
(
V
n)
is a
disconnected set, which in turn happens when q < q
√
2+
√
pi
2
√
pi
− (
√
2−√pi)√piwu
2
.
To understand these results, consider first Figure 3, which illustrates the qualitative
features of the solution to the government’s problem for any given value of V
n
such that
V
n ∈ [(1− pi)UnLF , UnLF − pi2
(Y uLF−Y nLF )2
(wn)2
).
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Figure 3
In the figure, the dashed 45 degree line represents the laissez-faire budget line (no
taxes nor transfers), and points I and V represent the bundles chosen under laissez-faire
by, respectively, non-users and users (Y nLF > Y
u
LF ). Bundle II represents the undistorted
bundle offered to non-users on their indifference curve associated with Un = V
n
. The
blue 45 degree line represents the virtual budget line on which, given the revenue ex-
tracted from non-users, a bundle for users can be offered.9 On this virtual budget line,
incentive-compatibility considerations (the need to satisfy the λ-constraint) prevents the
government from offering users the undistorted bundle labelled VI. To prevent non-users
from behaving as mimickers, users can only be offered, on the virtual budget line, either
bundles to the left of III or bundles to the right of IV, with both bundle III and bundle
IV belonging to the set of admissible bundles. The difference between these two sets of
bundles is that, whereas with bundle III, or bundles to the left of it, type separation is
achieved by imposing a sufficiently large downward distortion on the users’ labor supply,
9The value of the intercept of the blue 45 degree line is given by
(
UnLF − V
n
)
(1− pi) /pi. Thus, the
intercept is higher the smaller is V
n
(i.e., the larger is the tax collected from each non-user) and the
smaller is pi (i.e., the smaller is the fraction of transfer-recipients).
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in the case of bundle IV, or bundles to the right of it, type separation is achieved by
imposing a sufficiently large upward distortion on the users’ labor supply.
The black curve passing through bundle III is an indifference curve pertaining to
users. The figure shows that, among all the admissible bundles that can be offered to
users, bundle III is the one at which their utility is maximized. In particular, notice
that the utility of users is strictly higher at bundle III than at bundle IV. The intuition
is that, even though the λ-constraint can be satisfied by imposing either a sufficiently
large downward- or a sufficiently large upward distortion on the labor supply of users, the
size of the required distortion is smaller when type separation is obtained by distorting
downwards the users’ labor supply (T ′ (Y uSB) > 0). This allows achieving type separation
at a lower efficiency cost.
Consider now Figure 4, which illustrates the solution to the government’s problem for
the case when V
n
is lowered to (1− pi)UnLF .
Figure 4
In Figure 4, the dashed 45 degree line represents the laissez-faire budget line, and the
point labelled I on this line represents the bundle selected by non-users under laissez-faire.
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Bundle II represents the undistorted bundle offered to non-users lying on the indifference
curve where V
n
= (1− pi)UnLF . The blue 45 degree line represents the virtual budget line
on which a bundle for users can be offered given the revenue extracted from non-users.
Incentive compatibility requires that, on the blue virtual budget line, users can only be
offered either bundle III or bundles to the right of IV, with bundle IV belonging to the
set of admissible bundles. The black curve passing through bundle III is an indifference
curve pertaining to users and it shows that bundle III is strictly preferred by users to
bundle IV. Comparing bundle III in Figure 4 with the corresponding bundle in Figure
3, we can also see that the size of the downward distortion on the users’ labor supply is
larger in Figure 4.10 The important thing to notice, however, is that at bundle III the
users’ labor supply has been pushed to its lower bound (Y u = 0).11
In a standard model where the SC condition holds, the utility achieved by users at
bundle III in Figure 4 would represent their maximal utility along the second-best PF.
The reason is straightforward. Suppose that single-crossing were satisfied and that at
all bundles in the (Y,B)-space users had steeper indifference curves. Then, the users’
indifference curve represented in Figure 4 would lie everywhere above the indifference
curve of non-users, except at bundle III. But this would necessarily imply that, if non-
users were to be offered a bundle on a lower indifference curve (to increase the tax revenue
collected from them), any (Y,B)-bundle that makes users better off (compared to bundle
III in Figure 4) would violate incentive-compatibility since it would induce non-users to
behave as mimickers.
With SC being violated, instead, things are different. In Figure 4 all the bundles
that are included in the gray area represent bundles that would at the same time: i)
make users better off (compared to the utility that they achieve at bundle III), and
ii) be incentive-compatible in the sense that they would not induce non-users to reject
bundle II. Even though the bundles in the gray area cannot be offered to users since
they violate the public-budget constraint (when V
n
= (1− pi)UnLF and non-users are
offered the bundle II), users might be offered a bundle in the gray area if more revenue
were collected from non-users, so that the blue virtual budget line could be shifted up.
However, since collecting more revenue from non-users implies moving them on a lower
10This is easily understood by looking at Figure 3 and thinking at how bundle III would be affected by
a downward shift in the indifference curves of non-users. Since such a downward shift would also entail
an upward shift in the intercept of the 45-degree virtual budget line (as more revenue is collected from
non-users), the new bundle III would be necessarily associated with a lower value of the users’ labor
supply.
11One can also notice that when V
n
= (1− pi)UnLF and users are offered bundle III, utilities are
equalized: Uu = V
n
= (1− pi)UnLF .
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indifference curve, and since this implies that the set of bundles in the gray area shrinks,
the violation of SC is in general not sufficient to guarantee that the utility of users can be
raised above the utility reached at bundle III. What is required is that the simultaneous
upward shift in the virtual budget line, and downward shift in the indifference curve of
non-users, push their point of intersection (currently at point IV in Figure 4) inside the
gray area. This is more likely to happen the smaller is pi and the smaller the difference
Y nLF − Y uLF (> 0).12
Notice also that at any bundle inside the gray area the labor supply of users is upward
distorted (T ′ (Y uSB) < 0). Thus, if it is indeed possible, by lowering V
n
below (1− pi)UnLF ,
to raise Uu above the level that it achieves at bundle III, users will need to be assigned a
bundle at which their labor supply is upward distorted. Moreover, since the users’ utility
is strictly higher at bundle III than at bundle IV, raising Uu above the value achieved at
bundle III would necessarily require a discrete downward jump in V
n
. This is illustrated
in Figure 5 below which shows the second-best PF with the property that the domain of
the function UuSB
(
V
n)
is disconnected.
Finally, notice that when the second-best PF looks like in Figure 5, the earned-income
ranking that corresponds to the various points on the frontier is not always consistent
with the income ranking under laissez-faire. Along the region where V
n
< UnLF , one
moves from a portion of the second-best PF that coincides with the first-best frontier
(the green part with slope − (1− pi) /pi), to a portion where T ′ (Y uSB) > 0 (the red part
of the curve in Figure 5), and finally to a portion where T ′ (Y uSB) < 0 (the blue part
of the curve in Figure 5). When entering this last portion, the earned-income ranking
is no longer consistent with the one under laissez-faire since we have Y nLF > Y
u
LF but
Y nSB < Y
u
SB.
Both the possibility that the second-best PF is disconnected and the possibility of
income re-ranking follow from the circumstance that in our setting the SC condition
is violated.13 Similarly, it is because of the violation of the SC condition that, when
12Regarding the effect of pi, the reason is that a smaller pi implies that a given upward shift in the
blue virtual budget line can be accommodated by a smaller downward shift in the indifference curves
of non-users. Regarding the effect of Y nLF − Y uLF , assume that, for given wn, either wu increases or q
decreases (while still satisfying the inequality (wn)
2
> wu (wu − q) so that Y nLF − Y uLF > 0). This would
produce a flattening effect on the indifference curve for users that is displayed in Figure 4, which would
in turn imply that its second intersection with the indifference curve of non-users would occur at a lower
value of Y . A smaller upward shift in the blue virtual budget line would then be needed to move bundle
IV inside the gray area.
13Notice that in a model without income effects on labor supply, as the one that we have been con-
sidering, the income-ranking under a first-best optimum is always consistent with the income ranking
under laissez-faire (since whenever their labor supply is left undistorted, agents will always work the
same amount as under laissez-faire, no matter how large is the tax that they pay or the transfer that
they receive). Thus, the fact that the income ranking under a second-best optimum may differ with
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redistribution favors users, it might be optimal to let them face a negative marginal tax
rate even in cases when they earn less than non-users under laissez-faire. This shows that
the violation of SC can provide a novel rationale for negative marginal tax rates.14
4 Subsidizing work-related expenses
In our analysis we have so far maintained the assumption that the only policy instrument
is a nonlinear income tax. In this setting we have highlighted the consequences descending
from the violation of the SC condition. Most governments, however, allow special tax
treatments for work-related expenses.15 To consider this possibility, and given that a
“special” tax treatment usually implies a more lenient one, we will now investigate how
our results are affected when job-related expenses are subsidized at a flat rate s > 0 that
is optimally chosen.16 Moreover, since a subsidy on job-related expenses is only valuable
respect to the one prevailing under laissez-faire also implies that the income ranking under a second-best
optimum may differ with respect to the one prevailing under a first-best optimum.
14Previous contributions that have highlighted the possibility that negative marginal tax rates are
optimal include Stiglitz (1982), Saez (2002) and Chone´ and Laroque (2010). In these papers the SC con-
dition is satisfied and the justification for negative marginal tax rates either comes from the assumption
that wages are endogenous or from specific assumptions on the profile of social weights that apply to the
different types of agents in the economy.
15Recent contributions that have analyzed the optimal tax treatment of work-related expenses include
Koehne and Sachs (2017), Bastani et al. (2020) and Ho and Pavoni (2020), where the last two papers
explicitly focus on the case of child care expenditures. A common feature of these papers is that they
consider a setting where all agents are, according to our terminology, “users”.
16We are implicitly assuming that job-related expenses are not observable by the government at the
individual level so that a nonlinear subsidy scheme is not an option. Lack of public observability of
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to users, we will confine our attention to the portion of the PF where V
n
< UnLF , i.e. to
the portion of the PF where redistribution goes from non-users to users.
The first thing to notice is that the subsidy has a flattening effect on the indifference
curves for users in the (Y,B)-space. For a given (positive) value of s and a given bundle in
the (Y,B)-space, we have thatMRSuY B =
(
(1− s) q + Y
wu
)
/wu. Thus, the threshold value
for Y , separating the bundles where MRSuY B > MRS
n
Y B from those where MRS
u
Y B <
MRSnY B, lowers from Ω, as defined in (4), to
Y = (1− s)Ω. (7)
Hence, the SC property is restored if s ≥ 1.17
Most importantly, notice that in our setting a subsidy on job-related expenses repre-
sents a very effective instrument to redistribute towards users. This is because non-users
derive no benefit from the subsidy. Therefore, channeling at least part of the resources
transferred to users through a subsidy on job-related expenses makes it less attractive for
non-users to behave as mimickers. One can then expect that, by supplementing an opti-
mal nonlinear income tax with an optimally chosen s, the first-best PF and the second-
best PF will coincide over a larger set of values for V
n
. In particular, since we know from
the analysis in Section 3 that an optimal nonlinear income tax is sufficient to implement a
first-best optimum (i.e., a point on the first-best PF) when V
n ∈ [UnLF−pi2
(Y uLF−Y nLF )2
Y nLF
, UnLF ),
one can expect that using s as an additional policy tool allows implementing a first-best
optimum also for a range of values for V
n
that are strictly lower than UnLF − pi2
(Y uLF−Y nLF )2
Y nLF
.
As shown in Proposition 4 below, which looks at the solution to the government’s prob-
lem for values of V
n
such that −UnLF ≤ V
n
< UnLF − pi2
(Y uLF−Y nLF )2
Y nLF
, this intuition is indeed
correct.18,19
personal purchases is an assumption that is often made in the optimal tax literature (see, e.g., Anderberg
and Balestrino, 2000; Cremer et al., 2001; Blomquist et al., 2010; Jacobs and Boadway, 2014; Casarico et
al., 2015). In our setting it appears a realistic case to consider since individuals have often the possibility
to misreport their true work-related expenses to the tax authority. For purchases of work-related goods,
as opposed to work-related services, the possibility of reselling by agents exacerbates the problem of
observing consumption at the individual level.
17For s < 1 the SC property remains violated. For s = 1 users would have flatter (steeper) indifference
curves at any point in the (Y,B)-space whenever wu > (<)wn. From the perspective of agents, s = 1
is equivalent to granting them a refundable tax credit for all their work-related expenses (since offering
agents a refundable tax credit for a fraction s of their work-related expenses is equivalent to subsidize
work-related expenses at the rate s). Obviously, the SC property would also be restored for s > 1.
18The reason for restricting attention to cases where V
n ≥ −UnLF is that it allows us to neglect the
possibility that the labor supply of non-users is distorted at a first-best optimum due to the non-negativity
constraint on private consumption. See the discussion in subsection 2.2.
19As explained in the beginning of Section 4, due to the fact that a “special” tax treatment for work-
related expenses usually means that these kind of expenses are subject to a more lenient tax treatment,
in our analysis we restrict attention to the case when work-related expenses are subsidized. However,
one can show that a positive tax on work-related expenses (s < 0) can be used as an instrument that
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Proposition 4 Assume that −UnLF ≤ V
n
< UnLF − pi2
(Y uLF−Y nLF )2
Y nLF
and that the government
is optimizing a nonlinear income tax and a proportional subsidy on work-related expenses.
Moreover, let V̂ ≡ UnLF − pi2 2w
u−q
wu
(Y nLF − Y uLF ) be a threshold value for V
n
.
i) Suppose that q ≤ q (i.e., Y uLF ≥ Y nLF ); then, the second-best PF will coincide with
the first-best PF.
ii) Suppose that q > q (i.e., Y uLF < Y
n
LF ). For V
n ≥ V̂ , the second-best PF coincides
with the first-best PF. For V
n
< V̂ , instead, both self-selection constraints will be
binding and any point on the second-best PF corresponds to an allocation at which
both types of agents face a distortion on their labor supply.
Proof. See Appendix D.
According to Proposition 4, there is a crucial difference between cases where q ≤ q and
cases where q > q. In the first scenario, using s as an additional policy instrument always
allows implementing a first-best optimum. Instead, when q > q, a first-best optimum
can only be implemented as long as the utility of non-users does not fall below a given
threshold value V̂ . Below, we discuss in two separate subsections the results provided by
Proposition 4.
4.1 Part i)
Consider an initial equilibrium where an optimal nonlinear income tax is used in isolation
(s = 0) and users are offered a distorted bundle to prevent mimicking by non-users. The
transfer received by each user is equal to Bu− Y u at the initial equilibrium. Introducing
a small subsidy on job-related expenses (ds > 0), while at the same time adjusting Bu
downwards by dBu = − (qY u/wu) ds, would leave unchanged the net transfer received
by each user.20 Such a reform, however, would make mimicking less attractive for non-
users.21 Therefore, by relaxing the incentive-compatibility constraint for non-users, the
reform would pave the way for the possibility to offer users a bundle where their labor
supply is less distorted and their utility is higher. When Y uLF ≥ Y nLF , one can replicate
the kind of reform described above (which hinges on raising s, lowering Bu and moving
Y u closer to its undistorted level) until a first-best optimum is achieved where no agent’s
makes it less attractive for users to behave as mimickers. Thus, supplementing a nonlinear income tax
with a tax on work-related expenses would allow to shift outwards the PF when V
n
> UnLF .
20When a nonlinear income tax is supplemented with a subsidy on job-related expenses, the net transfer
received by each user is equal to Bu − Y u + sqY u/wu.
21For non-users, the subsidy s is of no value; their utility when behaving as mimickers is given by
Bu − (Y u/wn)2 /2.
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labor supply is distorted. This is because one can set s with the sole purpose of deterring
mimicking by non-users, safely disregarding the other self-selection constraint, i.e. the
one requiring users not to behave as mimickers. The intuition is provided in Figure 6
below. Y-T(Y)
I 
I 
I 
I 
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y�F
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Figure 6
In Figure 6, the bundle labelled I represents the undistorted bundle offered to non-
users and lying on the red indifference curve where Un = V
n
< UnLF . The blue 45
degree line represents the virtual budget line on which a bundle for users can be offered,
given the revenue extracted from non-users, when a nonlinear income tax is used in
isolation (s = 0). Incentive compatibility prevents the government from offering users
the (first-best) undistorted bundle labelled IV. Instead, users will be offered the incentive-
compatible bundle labelled III. Keeping fixed V
n
and supplementing a nonlinear income
tax with a subsidy on job-related expenses implies that users can be offered a bundle on a
virtual budget line that is flatter than the one prevailing when s = 0. In particular, while
its intercept does not change,22 its slope drops from 1 to 1− sq/wu. The dashed blue line
22The intercept is always equal to
(
UnLF − V
n
)
(1− pi) /pi, which represents the per-user transfer that
22
represents the virtual budget line generated by supplementing a nonlinear income tax
with a subsidy which is just large enough to allow the government to offer an undistorted
bundle to users (bundle labelled II) without inducing mimicking by non-users. Notice that
the vertical distance between bundle IV and bundle II is equal to sqY uLF/w
u. Taking into
account that, at bundle IV, the subsidy was set equal to zero, whereas at bundle II users
save an amount sqY uLF/w
u on job-related expenses, users get the same net consumption
at both bundles, and therefore enjoy the same utility (since labor supply is the same). It
is also obvious from the figure that users, whose indifference curve is depicted in black,
have no incentive to behave as mimickers since they strictly prefer bundle II to bundle I.
The reason is easy to grasp. At bundle II their indifference curve is tangent to the virtual
budget line generated by supplementing the income tax with a subsidy on job-related
expenses. Thus, along the black indifference curve, at all bundles to the left of II we have
that MRSuY B < 1− sq/wu < 1. Instead, along the red indifference curve (for non-users),
at all bundles between I and II we have that MRSnY B > 1. Therefore, the fact that the
two indifference curves cross at bundle II necessarily implies that bundle II is strictly
preferred by users to bundle I.
4.2 Part ii)
Things are instead different when Y uLF < Y
n
LF . In this case, setting s large enough to
deter mimicking by non-users might imply that users have an incentive to mimic non-
users. The intuition why this other self-selection constraint cannot always be disregarded
is provided in Figure 7 below.
In Figure 7 the bundle labelled I represents the undistorted bundle offered to non-
users. The blue 45 degree line represents the virtual budget line on which a bundle for
users can be offered, given the revenue extracted from non-users, when a nonlinear income
tax is used in isolation. Incentive compatibility prevents the government from offering
users the undistorted bundle labelled IV; instead users will be offered the incentive-
compatible bundle labelled III. The dashed blue line is the virtual budget line generated
by supplementing a nonlinear income tax with a subsidy which is just large enough to
allow the government to offer an undistorted bundle to users (bundle labelled II) without
inducing mimicking by non-users. As was the case in Figure 6, users get the same net
consumption at both bundle IV (without the subsidy) and bundle II (with the subsidy),
and therefore enjoy the same utility at both bundles. The figure shows that users, whose
indifference curve is depicted in black, are indifferent between choosing the bundle II,
can be financed when the utility of non-users is set at V
n
< UnLF .
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intended for them by the government, and choosing the bundle intended for non-users.23
The case represented in Figure 7 shows a situation where both self-selection constraints
are binding but the government is still able to implement a first-best optimum.24 This
happens when Y uLF < Y
n
LF and V
n
= V̂ . Further lowering V
n
would no longer allow the
23Notice that this can only happen when job-related expenses are subsidized. With s = 0 and Y uLF <
Y nLF , at any given bundle to the left of Y
n
LF , users have an indifference curve that is steeper than the
one pertaining to non-users. When the two indifference curves cross the second time, it will happen at
a bundle where Y > Y nLF . Therefore, with s = 0, if non-users were indifferent between bundle I and
bundle II, users would strictly prefer bundle II.
24Notice that when a nonlinear income tax is used in isolation, as assumed in Section 3, the solution
to the government’s problem can never be a separating equilibrium where both self-selection constraints
are binding. To see the reason for this, suppose to start from a separating equilibrium where both
self-selection constraints are binding. With a binding public budget constraint, one (Y,B)-bundle will
be associated with a positive tax payment and another one with a negative tax payment. Then the
government could improve upon the initial set of bundles by implementing a pooling allocation where
all agents are offered the bundle to which is associated a positive tax payment (the utility of all agents
would be unaffected and the government would run a positive surplus). But this cannot be an optimum
either, since the government’s budget constraint would be slack. Consider instead the case when the
income tax is supplemented by a subsidy on job-related expenses. In Figure 7, the government budget
constraint would be violated if both groups were to choose bundle II; it would also be violated if both
groups were to choose bundle I (since the dashed blue line, on which a bundle for users can be offered
without violating public-budget balance, lies below bundle I).
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government to implement a first-best optimum. A higher subsidy would be needed to
still offer an undistorted bundle to users without inducing non-users to mimic. But a
higher subsidy would induce users to mimic non-users. Thus, lowering V
n
below V̂ will
induce the government to raise s, but not as much as it would be needed to offer users an
undistorted bundle. The optimal s will then represent a trade-off between the desirable
effects in terms of deterring mimicking by non-users and the undesirable effects of making
it more tempting for users to mimic non-users. At the resulting second-best optimum
both self-selection constraint are binding and both types face a distortion on their labor
supply.25
For V
n
lower than but sufficiently close to V̂ , the second-best optimum will be a
separating equilibrium where each group is offered a distinct (Y,B)-bundle and the labor
supply of both types is downward distorted (Y uSB < Y
u
LF , Y
n
SB < Y
n
LF and Y
u
SB < Y
n
SB).
As one keeps lowering V
n
, the distortions needed to implement a separating equilibrium
become larger and larger, and one finally reaches a value for V
n
below which it is no
longer possible to further increase the users’ utility.
However, notice that when s is an additional policy instrument, the redistributive
goals of the government do not necessarily require the implementation of a separating
equilibrium, i.e., an equilibrium where each group is offered a distinct (Y,B)-bundle.
Given that only users benefit from the subsidy s, redistribution can also be achieved by
implementing a pooling equilibrium where both groups are offered the same (Y,B)-bundle
(but have, nonetheless, different consumption). In particular, at a pooling equilibrium
the government would solve the following optimization problem:
max
Y,B,s
B − (1− s) q Y
wu
− 1
2
(
Y
wu
)2
subject to
B − 1
2
(
Y
wn
)2
= V
n
, (8)
Y −B = pisqY/wu. (9)
Substitute B = V
n
+ (Y/wn)2 /2 and sqY/wu = (Y −B) /pi, from constraint (8) and (9),
respectively, into the objective function. The constrained optimization problem above
can then be rewritten in an unconstrained way as
max
Y
V
n
+
1
2
(
Y
wn
)2
− q Y
wu
+
Y
pi
− V
n
pi
− 1
2pi
(
Y
wn
)2
− 1
2
(
Y
wu
)2
.
(10)
25As shown in Appendix E, when Y uLF < Y
n
LF such a second-best equilibrium will be the necessary
outcome under a max-min planner.
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From the first order condition of the problem above, denoting by Y p the optimal value
of Y , one gets:
Y p =
(wn)2wu
(1− pi) (wu)2 + pi (wn)2 (w
u − qpi) . (11)
Moreover, when wu (wu − q) < (wn)2 (i.e., Y uLF < Y nLF ), it is straightforward to show that
Y uLF < Y
p < Y nLF . (12)
From (12) we can conclude that, at a pooling equilibrium, the labor supply of users
is upward distorted and the labor supply of non-users is downward distorted. Moreover,
from (11) we can also see that, since Y p does not depend on V
n
, the magnitude of
these distortions does not depend on the specific value of V
n
. Substituting (11) into the
objective function of (10) we get that, at a pooling equilibrium, the users’ utility is given
by
Uu =
1
2pi
(wn)2 (wu − qpi)2
(1− pi) (wu)2 + pi (wn)2 − V
n1− pi
pi
,
which implies that ∂Uu/∂V
n
= − (1− pi) /pi, i.e. the same slope that characterizes the
first-best PF.
Clearly, for V̂ ≤ V n < UnLF , a pooling equilibrium will never be chosen by the govern-
ment. The reason is that, for V̂ ≤ V n < UnLF the government can implement a separating
equilibrium which allows attaining a point on the first-best PF. Under a pooling equilib-
rium, instead, it is never possible to reach a point on the first-best PF (given that the
labor supply of both groups of agents is distorted). For values of V
n
that are smaller
than but sufficiently close to V̂ , a separating equilibrium will again dominate a pooling
equilibrium; even though both equilibria entail a distortion on the labor supply of both
groups and a point on the first-best PF can no longer be attained, the distortions are
less severe under a separating equilibrium. However, for sufficiently low values of V
n
, a
pooling equilibrium will dominate a separating equilibrium. The reason is that the dis-
tortions needed to implement a separating equilibrium become larger and larger as one
keeps lowering V
n
; under a pooling equilibrium, instead, the magnitude of the distortions
does not depend on the specific value of V
n
. The possibility of both types of second-best
equilibria (separating and pooling), depending on the chosen value for V
n
, is illustrated
by means of a numerical example in Appendix F.26 The example also illustrates the fact
that the second-best PF can be disconnected even when the nonlinear income tax is
supplemented by an optimal subsidy on job-related expenses.
26See also Bastani et al. (2015) for another example of a two-type model where both self-selection
constraints may be binding at a separating equilibrium and where a pooling equilibrium may dominate
a separating equilibrium.
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5 Pareto efficient taxation when job-related expenses
are a nonlinear function of hours of work
In Section 3 we have emphasized three main anomalies descending from the violation
of SC: i) an anonymous nonlinear income tax may allow the government to convert a
pooling laissez-faire equilibrium into a separating equilibrium; ii) the second-best PF
may be disconnected; iii) a second-best optimum may not preserve the income ranking
prevailing under laissez-faire.
As we show in a background version of this paper (see Bastani et al., 2019), similar
qualitative results generalize, with some nuances, to a setting where the function ϕ (h)
(describing the work-related monetary costs) is convex or concave. However, when ϕ (h)
is concave, one additional anomaly may arise. In particular, when redistribution goes
from non-users to users, it is possible that a second-best optimum entails a distortion
on the labor supply of users even when no self-selection constraint is (locally) binding in
equilibrium. The reason is that, when ϕ (h) is sufficiently concave, it is no longer the case
that MRSuY B is monotonically increasing in Y .
27 To see this, notice that, for individual
preferences given by U = c − h2/2 and a general nonlinear function ϕ (h), MRSuY B
is given by MRSuY B = [ϕ
′ (Y/wu) + Y/wu] /wu. Assume that ϕ (h) is an increasing
and concave function which also satisfies the conditions ϕ′ (0) > wu, ϕ′′ (0) < −1, and
ϕ′′′ (h) > 0. Then, while the value of MRSuY B is always positive for Y ≥ 0, it is larger
than 1 and decreasing in Y for sufficiently small values of Y . The fact that MRSuY B > 1
for sufficiently low values of Y implies that, when incentive-compatibility considerations
require that Y u must be very small (to prevent mimicking by non-users), it may be optimal
to offer users a bundle where Y u = 0 even though it would be incentive-compatible to
let them increase to some extent their labor supply (and enjoy a slightly larger value of
consumption). This possibility is illustrated in Figure 8 below and a numerical example
is provided in Appendix F.
In Figure 8, the point I represents the bundle selected by non-users under laissez-faire.
Bundle II represents the undistorted bundle offered to non-users lying on the indifference
curve where Un = V
n
< UnLF . The blue 45 degree line represents the virtual budget
line on which a bundle for users can be offered given the revenue extracted from non-
users. Incentive compatibility requires that users can only be offered bundles to the left
of bundle V and to the right of bundle VI, with both V and VI belonging to the set of
admissible bundles. The three black curves passing through bundles V, IV and III are
27In other words, the indifference curves for users are not everywhere convex.
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three different indifference curves pertaining to users.
From the figure, one can see that bundle IV is strictly preferred by users to both
the bundle V and bundle VI. But if users are offered the bundle IV, the self-selection
constraint requiring non-users not to mimic users is slack. Notice also that users would
be better off if they could get bundle III on the blue virtual budget line, i.e. the bundle at
which their labor supply is undistorted. However, offering them this bundle would induce
mimicking by non-users. Therefore, at a second-best optimum users are offered bundle
IV and non-users are offered bundle II; the labor supply of users is downward distorted
even though no self-selection constraint is binding at the second-best optimum.28,29
28Nonetheless, the reason why users are offered a distorted bundle is ultimately due to the need to
prevent mimicking from non-users and ensure proper self-selection by agents.
29It should be noticed that the labor supply of users is downward distorted even though at bundle
IV the users’ MRS is larger than 1, i.e. it satisfies the standard definition of upward distortion. This
happens because the standard definition of downward and upward distortion is only valid insofar as an
individual’s indifference curves are everywhere convex in the (Y,B)-space. To clarify this point, suppose
that the indifference curves are everywhere convex and that an individual is located at a bundle A where
his MRS is larger (resp.: smaller) than 1. Then, the conclusion that the labor supply of this agent
is upward (resp.: downward) distorted is based on the observation that, if the individual could freely
choose any bundle along a 45-degree line going through bundle A, he would choose a bundle to the left
(resp.: right) of bundle A. However, if the indifference curves are not everywhere convex, the fact that
28
6 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we have considered a two-type optimal nonlinear income tax model where
agents differ both in terms of market ability and in terms of “needs” for a work-related
good/service, i.e. a good/service that some agents need to purchase in order to work.
Because of this bi-dimensional heterogeneity, the single-crossing conditions fails to hold.
Ruling out public observability of individual types, we have characterized the properties
of a second-best optimum by looking at the entire second-best Pareto frontier.
We have highlighted that, due to the violation of single-crossing, some non-standard
results arise. First of all, a second-best optimum might not preserve the earned-income
ranking that prevails under laissez-faire. Second, redistribution via income taxation might
be feasible even when the laissez-faire equilibrium is a pooling equilibrium. Third, a
second-best optimum might not be unique, in the sense that there might be more than
one set of allocations in the (pre-tax income, after-tax income)-space that solve the gov-
ernment’s maximization problem. Fourth, the second-best Pareto frontier may be discon-
nected. Fifth, supplementing an optimal nonlinear income tax with an optimal subsidy
on work-related expenses may imply that redistribution is achieved through a separating-
or pooling equilibrium where both self-selection constraints are binding. Sixth, we have
shown that the labor supply of some agents might be distorted even though no self-
selection constraint is (locally) binding in equilibrium.
Before concluding, a final remark is in order. For tractability reasons, we have focused
our analysis on a simplified two-type model where skills and needs are perfectly correlated.
However, insofar as our non-standard results hinge on the violation of the single-crossing
condition, they generalize, with some nuances, to settings with a larger number of types
and imperfect correlation between skills and needs.
Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1. Assume first that V
n
< UnLF , so that users are offered a (Y,B)-
bundle such that Y u−Bu < 0 and non-users a (Y,B)-bundle such that Y n−Bn > 0. With
income tax revenue collected from each non-user being equal to Y n − Bn, the revenue
that can be transferred to each user is equal to (Y n −Bn) (1− pi) /pi. With non-users
being offered a bundle on their indifference curve with associated utility value V
n
, the
maximum revenue that the government can collect from them is obtained at the bundle
MRS > (<) 1 at bundle A does not imply that, if the agent were free to choose any bundle along a
45-degree line going through bundle A, he/she would necessarily choose a bundle to the left (resp.: right)
of bundle A.
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where their labor supply is undistorted, implying a zero implicit marginal income tax rate
for non-users.30 Thus, independently on the value of V
n
, we will have that Y n = (wn)2.
With V
n
< UnLF and Y
n = (wn)2, the government collects from each non-user an
amount of revenue equal to Y n − Bn = (wn)2 − [V n + (1/2) (wn)2] = (1/2) (wn)2 −
V
n
. This implies that the revenue that can be transferred to each user is equal to
(1− pi) [(1/2) (wn)2 − V n] /pi, which in turn implies that users will be offered a bundle
on the virtual budget line
B =
1− pi
pi
[
1
2
(wn)2 − V n
]
+ Y. (A1)
On this virtual budget line, however, some bundles cannot be offered since they would
induce mimicking by non-users. To find the set of incentive-compatible bundles on the
virtual budget line (A1), one has to identify the values for Y at which the relevant
indifference curve for non-users (i.e. the one associated with utility V
n
) intersects the
virtual budget line.
Taking into account that the relevant indifference curve for non-users has equation
B = V
n
+
1
2
(
Y
wn
)2
, (A2)
by equating (A1) and (A2) one can find two values for Y . These are given by:
Y = (wn)2
{
1±
√
1− 2
(wn)2
1
pi
[
V
n − 1
2
(1− pi) (wn)2
]}
= (wn)2
{
1±
√
1
pi
− 2
(wn)2
1
pi
V
n
}
= (wn)2 ± wn
√
1
pi
[
(wn)2 − 2V n], (A3)
where the term within square root is positive due to the initial assumption that V
n
<
UnLF = (w
n)2 /2.
On the virtual budget line (A1) only the bundles with Y ≤ (wn)2−wn
√
1
pi
[
(wn)2 − 2V n]
and Y ≥ (wn)2 +wn
√
1
pi
[
(wn)2 − 2V n] are incentive-compatible (i.e., do not induce non-
users to behave as mimickers).31 If incentive-compatibility considerations were not an
30This is true as long as the undistorted bundle on the indifference curve V
n
does not violate the
constraint Bn ≥ 0, i.e. as long as V n ≥ −UnLF . As we discuss in subsection 2.2, in our characterization
of the PF we impose the restriction that the utility of non-users cannot fall below −UnLF (see subsection
2.2. and in particular condition (5)).
31Notice that, for sufficiently low values of V
n
(in particular, V
n
< (1− pi) (wn)2 /2), the lower root of
(A3) is negative; when this happens, the set of incentive-compatible bundles on the virtual budget line
(A1) is given by those bundles where Y is greater or equal to the larger root.
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issue, users could be offered on the virtual budget line (A1) the undistorted bundle
(Y,B) =
(
(wu − q)wu, (wu − q)wu + 1− pi
pi
[
1
2
(wn)2 − V n
])
.
Thus, if it is either the case that
(wu − q)wu ≥ (wn)2 + wn
√
1
pi
[
(wn)2 − 2V n], (A4)
or
(wu − q)wu ≤ (wn)2 − wn
√
1
pi
[
(wn)2 − 2V n], (A5)
the labor supply of users can be left undistorted (T ′ (Y uSB) = 0). Solving (A4) and (A5)
for V
n
, one finds that T ′ (Y uSB) = 0 when
V
n ≥ (w
n)4 − pi [(wu − q)wu − (wn)2]2
2 (wn)2
, (A6)
where the RHS of (A6) is strictly lower than (wn)2 /2 = UnLF .
Suppose instead that inequality (A6) does not hold. Offering users an undistorted
bundle along the virtual budget line (A1) would then violate the incentive-compatibility
constraint for non-users. This implies that users will either be offered the bundle (YA, BA)
where
YA = (w
n)2 − wn
√
1
pi
[
(wn)2 − 2V n], (A7)
BA =
1− pi
pi
[
1
2
(wn)2 − V n
]
+ (wn)2 − wn
√
1
pi
[
(wn)2 − 2V n]
=
1 + pi
2pi
(wn)2 − 1− pi
pi
V
n − wn
√
1
pi
[
(wn)2 − 2V n], (A8)
and their labor supply is distorted downwards (T ′ (Y uSB) > 0), or the bundle (YB, BB)
where
YB = (w
n)2 + wn
√
1
pi
[
(wn)2 − 2V n], (A9)
BB =
1− pi
pi
[
1
2
(wn)2 − V n
]
+ (wn)2 + wn
√
1
pi
[
(wn)2 − 2V n]
=
1 + pi
2pi
(wn)2 − 1− pi
pi
V
n
+ wn
√
1
pi
[
(wn)2 − 2V n], (A10)
and their labor supply is distorted upwards (T ′ (Y uSB) < 0).
For later purposes, notice that from (A7), since YA cannot take negative values, U
n
can never fall below (1− pi) (wn)2 /2 when users are offered the bundle (YA, BA).
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Evaluating the utility of users at the bundle characterized by (A7)-(A8), we have:
Uu (YA, BA) =
1 + pi
2pi
(wn)2 − 1− pi
pi
V
n − wn
√
1
pi
[
(wn)2 − 2V n]
− q
wu
{
(wn)2 − wn
√
1
pi
[
(wn)2 − 2V n]}
−1
2
(
1
wu
)2{
(wn)2 − wn
√
1
pi
[
(wn)2 − 2V n]}2 , (A11)
whereas the utility of users at the bundle characterized by (A9)-(A10) is
Uu (YB, BB) =
1 + pi
2pi
(wn)2 − 1− pi
pi
V
n
+ wn
√
1
pi
[
(wn)2 − 2V n]
− q
wu
{
(wn)2 + wn
√
1
pi
[
(wn)2 − 2V n]}
−1
2
(
1
wu
)2{
(wn)2 + wn
√
1
pi
[
(wn)2 − 2V n]}2 . (A12)
Before comparing the utility of users at (YA, BA) and (YB, BB), notice that a necessary
condition for (YA, BA) to be part of the second-best PF is that ∂U
u (YA, BA) /∂V
n
< 0
(and similarly, a necessary condition for (YB, BB) to be part of the second-best PF is that
∂Uu (YB, BB) /∂V
n
< 0).
Consider first ∂Uu (YA, BA) /∂V
n
. This is given by:
∂Uu (YA, BA)
∂V
n =
[
− (1− pi) +
(
wn
wu
)2]
1
pi
+
[
(wu − q)wu − (wn)2
(wu)2
]{
1
pi
[
(wn)2 − 2V n]}−1/2 wn
pi
.
(A13)
With q < q, we have that (wu − q)wu − (wn)2 > 0. Therefore, Uu (YA, BA) /∂V n < 0
when
(wn)2 − (1− pi) (wu)2
(wn)2 − (wu − q)wu
1
wn
>
1{
1
pi
[
(wn)2 − 2V n]}1/2 . (A14)
Under our assumption that pi < 1 − (wn)2 / (wu)2, it follows that (A14) is satisfied as
long as
V
n
<
(wn)2
2
1−
[
(wu − q)wu − (wn)2
(1− pi) (wu)2 − (wn)2
]2
pi
 , (A15)
where the RHS of (A15) is larger than (1− pi) (wn)2 /2 for pi < q/wu.
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Noticing that q < q =⇒ 1 − (wn)2
(wu)2
> q
wu
, we can conclude that, with q < q, offering
users the bundle (YA, BA) can never be optimal when pi ≥ qwu .
Consider now ∂Uu (YB, BB) /∂V
n
. This is given by:
∂Uu (YB, BB)
∂V
n =
[
− (1− pi) +
(
wn
wu
)2]
1
pi
+
(wn)2 − wu (wu − q)
(wu)2
{
1
pi
[
(wn)2 − 2V n]}−1/2 wn
pi
.
(A16)
With q < q, we have that ∂Uu (YB, BB) /∂V
n
< 0 when
1{
1
pi
[
(wn)2 − 2V n]}1/2 > (1− pi) (w
u)2 − (wn)2
wn
[
(wn)2 − wu (wu − q)] , (A17)
and our assumption that pi < 1− (wn)2 / (wu)2 implies that (A17) is always satisfied.
Let’s now compare Uu (YA, BA) and U
u (YB, BB) as given by (A11)-(A12). Simple
algebra can be used to show that
Uu (YA, BA)− Uu (YB, BB)
=
[
q
wu
+
(
1
wu
)2
(wn)2 − 1
]
2wn
√
1
pi
[
(wn)2 − 2V n]
=
(wn)2 − wu (wu − q)
(wu)2
2wn
√
1
pi
[
(wn)2 − 2V n]. (A18)
Therefore, we can conclude that Uu (YB, BB) > U
u (YA, BA) for q < q. This shows
that, when q < q and (A6) is violated, a second-best optimum will necessarily entail an
upward distortion on the labor supply of users (T ′ (Y uSB) < 0).
Assume now that V
n
> UnLF . This implies that the optimal bundles offered by the
government will entail Y n−Bn < 0 and Y u−Bu > 0. With revenue collected from each
user being equal to Y u−Bu, the revenue that can be transferred to each non-user is equal
to (Y u −Bu) pi/ (1− pi). With users being offered a bundle on their indifference curve
with associated utility value UuSB, the maximum revenue that the government can collect
from them is obtained at the bundle where their labor supply is undistorted (implying
a zero implicit marginal income tax rate for users). In our setting this implies that,
independently on the value of UuSB, we will have that Y
u = (wu − q)wu.32 Thus, when
32Remember that, as discussed in subsection 2.2, in our characterization of the PF we impose the
restriction that the utility of users cannot fall below −UuLF (see subsection 2.2. and in particular condition
(6)).
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the utility obtained by users at a second-best optimum is UuSB < U
u
LF and their labor
supply is left undistorted, the government collects from each user an amount of revenue
equal to Y u − Bu = (wu − q)wu − [UuSB + 12 (wu − q)2 + (wu − q) q] = 12 (wu − q)2 −
UuSB. This implies that the revenue that can be transferred to each non-user is equal
to
[
1
2
(wu − q)2 − UuSB
]
pi/ (1− pi), which in turn implies that non-users will be offered a
bundle on the virtual budget line:
B =
pi
1− pi
[
1
2
(wu − q)2 − UuSB
]
+ Y. (A19)
On this virtual budget line, however, some bundles cannot be offered since they would
induce mimicking by users. To find the set of incentive-compatible bundles, one has to
identify the two values for Y at which the relevant indifference curve for users (i.e. the
one associated with utility UuSB) intersects the virtual budget line.
Taking into account that the relevant indifference curve for users has equation
B = UuSB +
1
2
(
Y
wu
)2
+ q
Y
wu
, (A20)
by equating (A19) and (A20) we can find the two relevant values for Y . These are given
by
Y = (wu)2
{
1− q
wu
±
√
1 +
q2
(wu)2
− 2 q
wu
− 2
(wu)2
1
1− pi
[
UuSB − pi
1
2
(wu − q)2
]}
= (wu)2
{
1− q
wu
±
√
1
1− pi
[
q2
(wu)2
− 2 q
wu
+ 1− 2
(wu)2
UuSB
]}
= (wu)2
(
1− q
wu
)
± wu
√
1
1− pi
[
(wu − q)2 − 2UuSB
]
= (wu) (wu − q)± wu
√
1
1− pi
[
(wu − q)2 − 2UuSB
]
,
where the term within square root is positive due to our assumption that UuSB < U
u
LF =
(wu − q)2 /2.
On the virtual budget line (A19), the incentive-compatible bundles (which do not
induce users to behave as mimickers) are those satisfying either of the following two
conditions:
Y ≤ (wu) (wu − q)− wu
√
1
1− pi
[
(wu − q)2 − 2UuSB
]
,
Y ≥ (wu) (wu − q) + wu
√
1
1− pi
[
(wu − q)2 − 2UuSB
]
.
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If incentive-compatibility considerations were not an issue, non-users could be offered on
the virtual budget line (A19) the undistorted bundle
(Y,B) =
(
(wn)2 , (wn)2 +
pi
1− pi
[
1
2
(wu − q)2 − UuSB
])
.
Thus, if it is either the case that
(wn)2 ≥ (wu) (wu − q) + wu
√
1
1− pi
[
(wu − q)2 − 2UuSB
]
, (A21)
or
(wn)2 ≤ (wu) (wu − q)− wu
√
1
1− pi
[
(wu − q)2 − 2UuSB
]
, (A22)
the labor supply of non-users can be left undistorted (T ′ (Y nSB) = 0). Solving (A21) and
(A22) for UuSB, one finds that T
′ (Y nSB) = 0 when
UuSB ≥
(wu − q)2
2
− (1− pi)
[
(wu − q)wu − (wn)2]2
2 (wu)2
, (A23)
where the RHS of (A23) is strictly lower than (wu − q)2 /2 = UuLF .
Taking into account that when non-users are offered an undistorted bundle, their
utility is
Un = (wn)2 +
pi
1− pi
[
1
2
(wu − q)2 − UuSB
]
− (w
n)2
2
=
(wn)2
2
+
pi
1− pi
[
1
2
(wu − q)2 − UuSB
]
, (A24)
and substituting for UuSB in (A24) the value provided by the RHS of (A23), one gets the
maximum utility that can be enjoyed by non-users without resorting to distort their labor
supply:
Un =
(wn)2
2
+ pi
[
(wn)2 − (wu) (wu − q)]2
2 (wu)2
.
Suppose now that inequality (A23) does not hold. Offering non-users an undistorted
bundle along the virtual budget line (A19) would violate the incentive-compatibility con-
straint for users. This implies that non-users will either be offered the bundle (YC , BC)
where
YC = (w
u) (wu − q)− wu
√
1
1− pi
[
(wu − q)2 − 2UuSB
]
, (A25)
BC =
pi
1− pi
[
1
2
(wu − q)2 − UuSB
]
+ wu
{
wu − q −
√
1
1− pi
[
(wu − q)2 − 2UuSB
]}
,
(A26)
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and their labor supply is distorted downwards (T ′ (Y nSB) > 0), or the bundle (YD, BD)
where
YD = (w
u) (wu − q) + wu
√
1
1− pi
[
(wu − q)2 − 2UuSB
]
, (A27)
BD =
pi
1− pi
[
1
2
(wu − q)2 − UuSB
]
+ wu
{
wu − q +
√
1
1− pi
[
(wu − q)2 − 2UuSB
]}
,
(A28)
and their labor supply is distorted upwards (T ′ (Y nSB) < 0).
For later purposes, notice that from (A25), since YC cannot take negative values, U
u
can never fall below (wu − q)2 pi/2 when non-users are offered the bundle (YC , BC).
Evaluating the utility of non-users at the bundle characterized by (A25)-(A26), we
find that
Un (YC , BC) =
pi
1− pi
[
1
2
(wu − q)2 − UuSB
]
+ (wu) (wu − q)− wu
√
1
1− pi
[
(wu − q)2 − 2UuSB
]
−1
2
1
(wn)2
{
(wu) (wu − q)− wu
√
1
1− pi
[
(wu − q)2 − 2UuSB
]}2
,
(A29)
whereas the utility of non-users at the bundle characterized by (A27)-(A28) is
Un (YD, BD) =
pi
1− pi
[
1
2
(wu − q)2 − UuSB
]
+ (wu) (wu − q) + wu
√
1
1− pi
[
(wu − q)2 − 2UuSB
]
−1
2
1
(wn)2
{
(wu) (wu − q) + wu
√
1
1− pi
[
(wu − q)2 − 2UuSB
]}2
.
(A30)
Before comparing the utility of non-users at (YC , BC) and (YD, BD), notice that a neces-
sary condition for (YC , BC) to be part of the second-best PF is that ∂U
n (YC , BC) /∂U
u
SB <
0 (and similarly, a necessary condition for (YD, BD) to be part of the second-best PF is
that ∂Un (YD, BD) /∂U
u
SB < 0).
Consider first ∂Un (YC , BC) /∂U
u
SB. This is given by:
∂Un (YC , BC)
∂UuSB
=
−pi + (w
u)2
(wn)2
+
wu − (wu)2(wu−q)
(wn)2[
(wu−q)2−2UuSB
1−pi
]1/2
 11− pi . (A31)
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Thus, we have that ∂Un (YC , BC) /∂U
u
SB < 0 when
(wu)2 − pi (wn)2 + (w
n)2 − wu (wu − q)[
(wu−q)2−2UuSB
1−pi
]1/2 wu < 0. (A32)
For q < q, condition (A32) holds for
UuSB >
(wu − q)2
2
− (1− pi) (w
u)2
[
wu (wu − q)− (wn)2]2
2
[
(wu)2 − pi (wn)2]2 , (A33)
where the RHS of (A33) defines a lower bound for UuSB along the second-best PF.
Substituting for UuSB into (A29) the value provided by the RHS of (A33) allows de-
riving an upper bound for UnSB, and therefore V
n
. After tedious calculations one gets:33
UnSB =
(wn)2
2
+
pi
[
(wu − q)wu − (wn)2]2
2
[
(wu)2 − pi (wn)2] . (A34)
It is easy to verify that the RHS of (A33) is larger than 1
2
(wu − q)2−1−pi
2
[
(wu−q)wu−(wn)2
(wu)2−(wn)2 w
u
]2
,
which represents the value of UuSB that implies YC = Ω (where YC is defined by (A25) and
Ω ≡ q (wn)2wu
(wu)2−(wn)2 = (w
n)2 q/q represents the threshold value for Y separating the bundles
where MRSuY B > MRS
n
Y B, i.e. those bundles where Y < Ω, from the bundles where
MRSuY B < MRS
n
Y B, i.e. those bundles where Y > Ω). This shows that it can never be
optimal to discourage the labor supply of non-users to the point where Y nSB = 0.
Consider now ∂Un (YD, BD) /∂U
u
SB. This is given by:
∂Un (YD, BD)
∂UuSB
=
−pi + (w
u)2
(wn)2
−
wu − (wu)2(wu−q)
(wn)2[
(wu−q)2−2UuSB
1−pi
]1/2
 11− pi . (A35)
Thus, we have that ∂Un (YD, BD) /∂U
u
SB < 0 when
(wu)2 − pi (wn)2 − (w
n)2 − wu (wu − q)[
(wu−q)2−2UuSB
1−pi
]1/2 wu < 0. (A36)
However, condition (A36) is never satisfied when q < q. Therefore, when q < q and (A23)
is violated, a second-best optimum will necessarily entail a downward distortion on the
labor supply of non-users (T ′ (Y nSB) > 0).
Appendix B
Proof of Proposition 2. Consider first the case when the intended direction of re-
distribution is from non-users to users. When q = q, so that (wu − q)wu = (wn)2, the
33Details of the calculations are available upon request.
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RHS of inequality (A6) simplifies to (wn)2 /2, which is the utility achieved by non-users
under laissez-faire. This shows that, when q = q, it is never possible to redistribute from
non-users to users without distorting the labor supply of the latter. In order not to vio-
late the incentive-compatibility constraint for non-users, users can either be offered the
distorted bundle characterized by (A7)-(A8), where T ′ (Y uSB) > 0, or the distorted bundle
characterized by (A9)-(A10), where T ′ (Y uSB) < 0. But from (A18) we can see that, when
(wn)2 = (wu) (wu − q), users are indifferent between the two bundles. Thus, as long
as users prefer these bundles to their laissez-faire bundle, there will be two equivalent
second-best optima.
For users to be better off at their laissez-faire bundle than at either bundle (A7)-(A8)
or (A9)-(A10), i.e. for UuLF =
(wu−q)2
2
> Uu (YB, BB) = U
u (YA, BA), it must be that
(taking into account that (wn)2 = (wu) (wu − q)):
(wu − q)2
2
>
1 + pi
2pi
(wu) (wu − q)− 1− pi
pi
V
n
+
√
(wu) (wu − q)
√
1
pi
[
(wu) (wu − q)− 2V n]
− q
wu
{
(wu) (wu − q) +
√
(wu) (wu − q)
√
1
pi
[
(wu) (wu − q)− 2V n]}
−
{
(wu) (wu − q) +√(wu) (wu − q)√ 1
pi
[
(wu) (wu − q)− 2V n]}2
2 (wu)2
,
which, after simplifying and collecting terms, can be restated as
wu − q
pi
>
(
wu − q
pi
) 2
(wu − q)wuV
n
. (B1)
When q = q, our assumption that pi < 1− (wn)2
(wu)2
can be equivalently restated as pi < q/wu.
This implies that wu − q
pi
< 0. Then, (B1) holds when (wu − q)wu/2 < V n. But since
q = q implies (wn)2 = (wu) (wu − q), we also have that (B1) holds when V n > (wn)2 /2 =
UnLF . This means that redistribution from non-users to users is feasible and users will face
a non-zero marginal tax rate at a second-best optimum. For (1 − pi)UnLF ≤ V
n
< UnLF
there are two equivalent second-best optima, one where T ′ (Y uSB) > 0 and one where
T ′ (Y uSB) < 0. For V
n
< (1−pi)UnLF , since the bundle characterized by (A7)-(A8) becomes
non admissible (it would require Y u < 0), the second-best optimum is unique: users are
offered the bundle characterized by (A9)-(A10) and they face a negative marginal tax
rate.
Consider now the case when the intended direction of redistribution is from users to
non-users. In this case the RHS of inequality (A23) simplifies to (wu − q)2 /2, which
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is the utility achieved by users under laissez-faire. This shows that, when (wn)2 =
(wu) (wu − q), it is never possible to redistribute from users to non-users without dis-
torting the labor supply of the latter. In order not to violate the incentive-compatibility
constraint for users, non-users can either be offered the distorted bundle characterized
by (A25)-(A26) or the distorted bundle characterized by (A27)-(A28). With (wn)2 =
(wu) (wu − q), non-users are indifferent between the two bundles. However, from (A31)
and (A35) we also have that, when (wn)2 = (wu) (wu − q), ∂Un(YC ,BC)
∂UuSB
= ∂U
n(YD,BD)
∂UuSB
=[
−pi + (wu)2
(wn)2
]
1
1−pi > 0, which implies that there is no point on the PF where non-users
get a higher utility than under laissez-faire.
Appendix C
Proof of Proposition 3. Consider first the case when V
n
< UnLF . For q > q, (A13)
takes a negative sign, i.e. Uu (YA, BA) /∂V
n
< 0, when
(wn)2 − (1− pi) (wu)2
(wn)2 − (wu − q)wu
1
wn
<
1{
1
pi
[
(wn)2 − 2V n]}1/2 . (C1)
Under our assumption that pi < 1 − (wn)2 / (wu)2, inequality (C1) is always satisfied.
Therefore, one can keep raising the utility of users until V
n
is pushed down to the value
(1− pi) (wn)2 /2 (implying that YA, as defined by (A7), reaches its lower bound YA = 0,
and Uu
(
Y A, BA
)
= UnSB = (1− pi) (wn)2 /2).
Consider now the expression for ∂Uu (YB, BB) /∂V
n
provided by (A16). When q > q,
we have that ∂Uu (YB, BB) /∂V
n
< 0 when
1√
1
pi
[
(wn)2 − 2V n] < (1− pi) (w
u)2 − (wn)2
wn
[
(wn)2 − wu (wu − q)] . (C2)
Under our assumption that pi < 1− (wn)2 / (wu)2, (C2) is satisfied as long as
V
n
<
(wn)2
2
{
1− pi
[
(wn)2 − wu (wu − q)]2[
(1− pi) (wu)2 − (wn)2]2
}
, (C3)
where the RHS of (C3) is smaller than (1− pi) (wn)2 /2 for
(
1− (wn)2
(wu)2
>
)
pi > 1 −
(wn)2
(wu)2
+ w
u(wu−q)−(wn)2
(wu)2
and it is larger or equal than (1− pi) (wn)2 /2 for pi ≤ 1 − (wn)2
(wu)2
+
wu(wu−q)−(wn)2
(wu)2
. Notice in particular that, when pi is lower than but sufficiently close to
1− (wn)2 / (wu)2, the RHS of (C3) defines a value that is smaller than − (wn)2 /2, i.e. it
violates our constraint (5).
From (A18) we can also see that, for q > q (i.e., (wu − q)wu < (wn)2), Uu (YA, BA) >
Uu (YB, BB). Thus, when q > q and (A6) is violated, a second-best optimum will
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entail a downward distortion on the labor supply of users (T ′ (Y uSB) > 0) as long as
V
n ≥ (1− pi) (wn)2 /2. As we have noticed above, when V n = (1− pi) (wn)2 /2 and users
are offered the corresponding (YA, BA)-bundle, their utility is U
u
(
Y A, BA
)
= UnSB =
(1− pi) (wn)2 /2. Moreover, when V n = (1− pi) (wn)2 /2, YA is pushed to its lower bound,
i.e. YA = 0, which means that one has reached the limit of redistribution that can be
accomplished by downward distorting the users’ labor supply. Therefore, the second-best
PF can include points where V
n
< (1− pi) (wn)2 /2 if and only if, by pushing the utility
of non-users below (1− pi) (wn)2 /2 and offering users the corresponding (YB, BB)-bundle
(i.e., distorting upwards their labor supply), it is possible to raise the users’ utility above
(1− pi) (wn)2 /2. To verify whether this is indeed possible, notice first that, according to
(C3), ∂Uu (YB, BB) /∂V
n
< 0 requires V
n
to be sufficiently small. Taking into account
that in our analysis we require the constraint (5) to be satisfied, it then follows that
the second-best PF will include points where V
n
< (1− pi) (wn)2 /2 if and only if the
following condition holds:
Uu (YB, BB) |V n=−(wn)2/2> Uu (YA, BA) |V n=(1−pi)(wn)2/2 . (C4)
Evaluating (A11) at V
n
= (1− pi) (wn)2 /2 and (A12) at V n = − (wn)2 /2, condition (C4)
can be restated as
1 + pi
2pi
(wn)2 +
1− pi
pi
(wn)2
2
+ wn
√
1
pi
2 (wn)2 − q
wu
{
(wn)2 + wn
√
1
pi
2 (wn)2
}
−1
2
(
1
wu
)2{
(wn)2 + wn
√
1
pi
2 (wn)2
}2
>
1 + pi
2pi
(wn)2 − 1− pi
pi
(1− pi) (wn)2
2
− wn
√
(wn)2 − q
wu
{
(wn)2 − wn
√
(wn)2
}
−1
2
(
1
wu
)2{
(wn)2 − wn
√
(wn)2
}2
.
Simplifying and collecting terms, the inequality above can be rewritten as
1− pi
pi
(2− pi) (wn)2
2
+ (wn)2 + (wn)2
√
2
pi
− q
wu
(wn)2
[
1 +
√
2
pi
]
−1
2
(
1
wu
)2 [
1 +
√
2
pi
]2
(wn)4
> 0,
or equivalently, dividing all terms by (wn)2, as
(1− pi) (2− pi)
2pi
+
wu − q
wu
[
1 +
√
2
pi
]
>
1
2
(
1
wu
)2 [
1 +
√
2
pi
]2
(wn)2 . (C5)
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Based on (C5), we can then conclude that (C4) is satisfied provided that
(wn)2 <
(1− pi) (2− pi)
pi
[ √
pi√
pi +
√
2
]2
(wu)2 + 2wu (wu − q)
√
pi√
pi +
√
2
. (C6)
One should however not forget that Proposition 3 deals with the case when q > q, i.e.
(wn)2 > wu (wu − q). Therefore, we should also check that the condition (C6) is indeed
compatible with (wn)2 > wu (wu − q). For this purpose, what is required is to show that
the following inequality is satisfied:
wu (wu − q) < (w
u)2(√
pi +
√
2
)2 [(1− pi) (2− pi) + 2(√pi +√2)√piwu − qwu
]
, (C7)
where the RHS of (C7) is a restatement of the RHS of (C6).
Dividing all terms by wu, one can rewrite (C7) as
(wu − q)
[
1− 2
√
pi√
pi +
√
2
]
<
wu(√
pi +
√
2
)2 (1− pi) (2− pi) ,
from which, after some simple manipulations, one obtains
wu <
q
pi
(√
2−√pi) (√2 +√pi)
2− pi =
q
pi
,
or equivalently pi < q/wu.
Given that q > q =⇒ 1 − (wu)2
(wn)2
< q
wu
, inequality (C7) is always satisfied under our
assumption that pi < 1− (wu)2
(wn)2
.
Finally, since it can be easily established that the RHS of (C6) is strictly smaller than
(wu)2, one can conclude that the second-best PF also contains values of V
n
that are lower
than (1− pi) (wn)2 /2 when the following condition holds:
(wu (wu − q) <) (wn)2 < (1− pi) (2− pi) (w
u)2 + 2
√
pi
(√
pi +
√
2
)
wu (wu − q)(√
pi +
√
2
)2 ,
or equivalently, for values of q such that
(q <) q < q
√
2 +
√
pi
2
√
pi
−
(√
2−√pi)√piwu
2
. (C8)
When (C8) is satisfied so that the second-best PF includes a region where −UnLF ≤ V
n
<
(1− pi)UnLF , any point on that region corresponds to an allocation at which T ′ (Y nSB) = 0
and T ′ (Y uSB) < 0.
Having established under which conditions the second-best PF also contains values of
V
n
that are lower than (1− pi) (wn)2 /2, what is left to prove is that, when this happens,
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the second-best PF is disconnected. For this purpose, taking into account that ∀ V n ∈
[(1− pi) (wn)2
2
, (w
n)2
2
) we have Uu (YA, BA)− Uu (YB, BB) > 0, it is sufficient to show that
the following condition holds:
−∂U
u (YB, BB)
∂V
n |V n=(1−pi)(wn)2/2< −
∂Uu (YA, BA)
∂V
n |V n=(1−pi)(wn)2/2 .
Evaluating both (A13) and (A16) at V
n
= (1− pi) (wn)2 /2, the inequality above requires
that [
(1− pi) + w
u (wu − q)− 2 (wn)2
(wu)2
]
1
pi
<
[
(1− pi)−
(
wn
wu
)2
− (w
u − q)wu − (wn)2
(wu)2
]
1
pi
. (C9)
Multiplying both sides by (wu)2 pi, simplifying and collecting terms, one can rewrite (C9)
as
2
[
wu (wu − q)− (wn)2] < 0,
which is satisfied given that Proposition 3 refers to the case when q > q (which implies
wu (wu − q) < (wn)2).
Consider now the case when V
n
> UnLF . For q > q, (A32) is never satisfied, which
implies that it is never the case that ∂Un (YC , BC) /∂U
u
SB < 0. Regarding the sign of
∂Un (YD, BD) /∂U
u
SB, we have instead that (A36) holds, and therefore ∂U
n (YD, BD) /∂U
u
SB <
0, for values of UuSB that satisfy (A33). Thus, when q > q and (A23) is violated, a second-
best optimum will necessarily entail an upward distortion on the labor supply of non-users
(T ′ (Y nSB) < 0). Regarding the maximum value that can be achieved by the non-users’
utility along the second-best PF, it will depend on whether the lower bound for UuSB, as
provided by (A33), defines a value that is larger or not than the lower bound that we
have assumed in (6). If the RHS of (A33) is larger than − (wu − q)2 /2, i.e. if
(wu − q)2 > 1− pi
2
(wu)2
[
wu (wu − q)− (wn)2]2[
(wu)2 − pi (wn)2]2 ,
the maximum utility that can be achieved by non-users along the second-best PF is found
by evaluating (A30) at the value for UuSB provided by the RHS of (A33). In this case,
after tedious calculations, one obtains that
V
n
max =
(wn)2
2
+
pi (wn)2 (wu)2 − [2 (wu)2 − pi (wn)2]2
(wn)2
[
wu (wu − q)− (wn)2]2
2
[
(wu)2 − pi (wn)2]2 .
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If instead the RHS of (A33) is weakly smaller than − (wu − q)2 /2, i.e. if
(wu − q)2 ≤ 1− pi
2
(wu)2
[
wu (wu − q)− (wn)2]2[
(wu)2 − pi (wn)2]2 ,
the maximum utility that can be achieved by non-users along the second-best PF is found
by evaluating (A30) at UuSB = − (wu − q)2 /2. This gives:
V
n
max =
(wn)2
2
+
pi
1− pi (w
u − q)2 − 1
2
(wu − q)2
(wn)2
{
wu
(
1 +
√
2
1− pi
)
− (w
n)2
(wu − q)
}2
.
Appendix D
Proof of Proposition 4. Assume that (wu − q)wu 6= (wn)2 and that s = 0. If incentive-
compatibility considerations were not an issue, the government would assign, respectively,
non-users and users to the undistorted bundles
(Y n, Bn) =
(
(wn)2 , V
n
+
1
2
(wn)2
)
, (D1)
and
(Y u, Bu) =
(
(wu − q)wu, (wu − q)wu + 1− pi
pi
[
1
2
(wn)2 − V n
])
. (D2)
With −UnLF ≤ V
n
< UnLF − pi2
(Y uLF−Y nLF )2
Y nLF
, we know from Appendix A that users cannot be
offered the bundle (D2) since it violates the self-selection constraint requiring non-users
not to be tempted to choose the bundle intended for users. What we want to ascertain
is whether, by properly choosing the subsidy rate s, the government can offer users an
undistorted bundle while at the same time preventing mimicking from non-users.
Assume that the government introduces a subsidy at rate s > 0 and that it offers to
users the bundle
(Y us , B
u
s ) =
(
(wu − q)wu, (wu − q)wu + 1− pi
pi
[
1
2
(wn)2 − V n
]
− (wu − q) qs
)
, (D3)
while keeping unchanged at (D1) the bundle for non-users.
Comparing (D2) and (D3), we can see that, whereas Y u is the same, the value of Bu
in (D3) has been lowered by an amount (wu − q) qs = (Y u/wu) qs = huqs, which exactly
offsets the saving that users enjoy due to the subsidy on job-related expenses. Therefore,
the bundle (D3) represents an undistorted bundle that allows users to achieve the same
utility as under the bundle (D2). The difference is that, while offering (D2) with s = 0
is not incentive-compatible, offering (D3) with s > 0 prevents mimicking by non-users
provided that the following condition holds:
V
n ≥ Bus −
1
2
(
Y us
wn
)2
,
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i.e. provided that
V
n ≥ (wu − q)wu + 1− pi
pi
[
1
2
(wn)2 − V n
]
− (wu − q) qs− 1
2
(
(wu − q)wu
wn
)2
. (D4)
Solving for the minimum value for s, denoted by s∗, that satisfies inequality (D4), one
gets:
s∗ =
(wu − q)wu + 1
pi
[
1
2
(wn)2 − V n]− 1
2
(wn)4+[(wu−q)wu]2
(wn)2
(wu − q) q . (D5)
Thus, when s is set according to (D5) the government could offer users an undistorted
bundle, without inducing mimicking by non-users, even when V
n
< UnLF − pi2
(Y uLF−Y nLF )2
Y nLF
,
a result that could not be achieved if the government only relied on a nonlinear income
tax.
However, this does not allow concluding that the second-best optimum will necessarily
coincide with the first-best optimum. In fact, once s is chosen according to (D5), the
other self-selection constraint, i.e. the one requiring users not to be tempted to mimic
non-users, may become binding.34 The reason is that, since non-users are still offered the
undistorted bundle (D1), the consumption available for a user behaving as a mimicker, i.e.
choosing the bundle intended for non-users, increases by the amount (wn)2 sq/wu, where
(wn)2 /wu represents the labor supply of a user behaving as a mimicker. In particular,
users will not have an incentive to mimic non-users if the following condition holds:
(wu − q)wu + 1− pi
pi
[
1
2
(wn)2 − V n
]
− (wu − q) q − 1
2
(wu − q)2
≥ V n + 1
2
(wn)2 − (1− s) q (w
n)2
wu
− 1
2
(
(wn)2
wu
)2
, (D6)
where the LHS of the inequality above represents the utility achieved by users at the
undistorted bundle offered to them by the government, and the RHS represents the utility
that they would achieve if they were to choose the bundle (D1) intended for non-users.35
Rewriting (D6) as
1
pi
[
1
2
(wn)2 − V n
]
wu
(wn)2
− (wu − q) + 1
2
(wu − q)2 w
u
(wn)2
+
1
2
(wn)2
wu
≥ qs,
34This self-selection constraint is trivially non-binding at a second-best optimum when V
n
< UnLF and
the only policy instrument used by the government is a nonlinear income tax.
35Notice that the right hand side of (D6) can be rewritten as Bn − [(1− s) qY n/wu] − (Y n/wu)2 /2,
where the term (1− s) qY n/wu represents the effective outlay for job-related costs when users mimic
non-users and job-related expenses are subsidized at rate s.
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and substituting for s the value provided by (D5) gives:
1
pi
[
1
2
(wn)2 − V n
]
wu
(wn)2
− (wu − q) + 1
2
(wu − q)2 w
u
(wn)2
+
1
2
(wn)2
wu
≥
(wu − q)wu + 1
pi
[
1
2
(wn)2 − V n]− 1
2
(wn)4+[(wu−q)wu]2
(wn)2
wu − q .
Multiplying both sides of the inequality above by wu − q, one obtains
1
pi
[
1
2
(wn)2 − V n
]
wu (wu − q)
(wn)2
− (wu − q)2 + 1
2
(wu − q)3wu
(wn)2
+
1
2
(wn)2 (wu − q)
wu
≥
1
pi
[
1
2
(wn)2 − V n
]
− 1
2
(wn)4 + [(wu − q)wu]2
(wn)2
+ wu (wu − q) ,
which can be rewritten as
1
pi
[
1
2
(wn)2 − V n
]
wu (wu − q)− (wn)2
(wn)2
≥ 2 (w
u)2 (wn)2 (wu − q) + 2 (wu − q)2 (wn)2wu
2 (wn)2wu
−(w
u − q)3 (wu)2 + (wn)4 (wu − q) + (wn)4wu + (wu − q)2 (wu)3
2 (wn)2wu
.
Multiplying both sides of the inequality above by 2 (wn)2wu gives
1
pi
[
1
2
(wn)2 − V n
] [
wu (wu − q)− (wn)2] 2wu
≥ 2 (wu)2 (wn)2 (wu − q) + 2 (wu − q)2 (wn)2wu − (wu − q)3 (wu)2
− (wn)4 (wu − q)− (wn)4wu − (wu − q)2 (wu)3 ,
or, equivalently:
1
pi
[
1
2
(wn)2 − V n
] [
wu (wu − q)− (wn)2] 2wu
≥ 2 (wu − q) (wn)2wu (2wu − q)− (wu − q)2 (wu)2 (2wu − q)
− (wn)4 (2wu − q) ,
so that the the no-mimicking condition (D6) can be restated as follows:
2wu
pi
[
1
2
(wn)2 − V n
] [
wu (wu − q)− (wn)2] ≥ (q − 2wu) [wu (wu − q)− (wn)2]2 . (D7)
From (D7) one can see that, when wu (wu − q) − (wn)2 ≥ 0, users have no incentive to
mimic non-users. When instead (wn)2 > wu (wu − q), users have no incentive to mimic
non-users when the following condition holds:
2
pi
[
1
2
(wn)2 − V n
]
wu ≤ − (2wu − q) [wu (wu − q)− (wn)2] ,
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namely when
V
n ≥ 1
2
{
(wn)2 − pi2w
u − q
wu
[
(wn)2 − wu (wu − q)]} . (D8)
Therefore, when (wn)2 > wu (wu − q) and (D8) is violated, an optimal nonlinear income
tax coupled with an optimal subsidy on job-related expenses will not allow implementing
a first-best optimum.36
Notice also that the RHS of (D8) defines a value for V
n
that is lower than (w
n)2
2
−
pi[(wu−q)wu−(wn)2]2
2(wn)2
when (wn)2 > wu (wu − q).37 Thus, provided that V n is not too low,
an optimal subsidy allows implementing the first-best allocation even when (wn)2 >
wu (wu − q). In particular, the range of values for V n for which this occurs is given by:
1
2
{
(wn)2 − pi2w
u − q
wu
[
(wn)2 − wu (wu − q)]}
≤ V n < 1
2
{
(wn)2 − pi
[
(wu − q)wu − (wn)2]2
(wn)2
}
. (D9)
So far, our analysis has relied on the assumption that (wu − q)wu 6= (wn)2 so that
Y uLF 6= Y nLF . If instead Y uLF = Y nLF , it is easy to see that supplementing a nonlinear income
tax with a subsidy on job-related expenses allows implementing a first-best optimum. In
fact, assume that − (wn)2 /2 ≤ V n < (wn)2 /2 = UnLF . By offering to all agents, users
and non-users, the bundle (Y,B) =
(
(wn)2 , (w
n)2
2
+ V
n
)
and setting s =
(wn)2
2
−V n
(wu−q)qpi , one
achieves redistribution (UnSB = V
n
< UnLF ; U
u
SB = U
u
LF +
1−pi
pi
(
UnLF − V
n)
> UuLF ), while
at the same time leaving undistorted the labor supply of all agents (Y nLF = Y
n
SB = Y
u
LF =
Y uSB), maintaining incentive-compatibility (given that all agents are offered the same
bundle in the (Y,B)-space), and satisfying the public budget constraint (since the cost
of the subsidy benefiting users, i.e. (wu − q) sqpi, is exactly matched by the total revenue
collected through the income tax, i.e. (w
n)2
2
− V n).
Appendix E
Proof that, under a max-min social welfare function, both self-selection con-
straints are binding in equilibrium when s is optimally chosen and Y uLF < Y
n
LF .
36It can be easily verified that the RHS of (D8) is larger than −UnLF = − (wn)2 /2.
37Assume that (wn)
2 − wu (wu − q) > 0. The condition (wn)2 −
pi (2wu − q)
[
(wn)
2 − wu (wu − q)
]
/wu < (wn)
2 − pi
[
(wn)
2 − (wu − q)wu
]2
/ (wn)
2
can be re-
stated as
[
(wn)
2 − (wu − q)wu
]2
wu − (2wu − q)
[
(wn)
2 − wu (wu − q)
]
(wn)
2
< 0 and therefore[
(wn)
2 − (wu − q)wu
]
wu < (2wu − q) (wn)2. Simplifying terms one gets − (wu − q) (wu)2 <
(wu − q) (wn)2.
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Notice first that, when Y uLF < Y
n
LF , we have that U
u
LF < U
n
LF so that a max-min
planner will redistribute from non-users to users. From Appendix D we know that,
optimizing s along with a nonlinear income tax, a first-best optimum can be imple-
mented as long as V
n ≥ UnLF − pi2 2w
u−q
wu
(Y nLF − Y uLF ); for V
n
< UnLF − pi2 2w
u−q
wu
(Y nLF − Y uLF ),
the government will instead implement a second-best optimum where both self-selection
constraints are binding. Since the LHS of (D6) provides an expression for Uu
(
V
n)
under a first-best optimum, we have that, for V
n
= UnLF − pi2 2w
u−q
wu
(Y nLF − Y uLF ) =
1
2
{
(wn)2 − pi 2wu−q
wu
[
(wn)2 − wu (wu − q)]},
Uu = (wu − q)wu + 1− pi
2
2wu − q
wu
[
(wn)2 − wu (wu − q)]− q (wu − q)− 1
2
(wu − q)2
=
1
2
{
(wu − q)2 + (1− pi) 2w
u − q
wu
[
(wn)2 − wu (wu − q)]} ,
which implies that Uu
(
V
n)
< V
n
. In fact, we have:
Uu
(
V
n)− V n = 1
2
{
(wu − q)2 + (1− pi) 2w
u − q
wu
[
(wn)2 − wu (wu − q)]}
−1
2
{
(wn)2 − pi2w
u − q
wu
[
(wn)2 − wu (wu − q)]}
=
1
2
[
(wu − q)2 − (wn)2]+ 1
2
2wu − q
wu
[
(wn)2 − wu (wu − q)]
=
1
2wu
{
(wu − q)2wu − (wn)2wu + (2wu − q) [(wn)2 − wu (wu − q)]}
=
1
2wu
[
(wn)2 − (wu)2] (wu − q) < 0.
This shows that a max-min planner will implement an equilibrium where V
n
< UnLF −
pi
2
2wu−q
wu
(Y nLF − Y uLF ). But at this equilibrium, both self-selection constraints will be bind-
ing.
Appendix F
In the numerical examples below all numbers are rounded to two decimals to enhance
readability. The exact numbers are available upon request.
Switching from a separating to a pooling equilibrium when V
n
is gradually
reduced and work-related expenses are subsidized. Assume that wu = 11, wn =
10, q = 5 and pi = 1/2. Under laissez-faire we have that Y uLF = (w
u − q)wu = 66 and
Y nLF = (w
n)2 = 100, with UuLF = (w
u − q)2 /2 = 18 and UnLF = (wn)2 /2 = 50. Set V
n
=
UnLF − pi2 2w
u−q
wu
(Y nLF − Y uLF ) = 36.86, which represents the minimum value for V
n
that still
allows the government to implement a first-best optimum when a nonlinear income tax is
47
supplemented with an optimal subsidy. At the solution to the government’s problem we
get s = 68.31%, (Y u, Bu) = (66, 58.64), (Y n, Bn) = (100, 86.86), Uu (Y u, Bu) = 31.1364,
Un (Y n, Bn) = 36.86. We also have that T ′ (Y n) = 0 and T ′ (Y u) = 31.05%. Even though
users face a positive marginal income tax rate, their marginal effective tax rate, which is
given by T ′ (Y u)− sq/wu, is equal to 0.38
Lowering V
n
to 36.5 one gets a second-best optimum which is a separating equilib-
rium where both self-selection constraints bind. In particular, s = 69.79%, (Y u, Bu) =
(60.88, 55.03), (Y n, Bn) = (97.35, 83.89), Uu (Y u, Bu) = 31.36, Un (Y n, Bn) = 36.5.
Moreover, T ′ (Y n) = 2.65%, T ′ (Y u) = 35.95% and the marginal effective tax rate faced
by users is equal to 4.23%. The labor supply of both types is downward distorted.
Setting V
n
= 35, one gets a separating equilibrium where Uu = 31.42 and Un = 36.05;
since Un > V
n
, it follows that V
n
= 35 does not belong to the domain of the function
Uu
(
V
n)
which describes the Pareto frontier.
Finally, assume that V
n
= 33. In this case the solution to the government’s problem
is a pooling equilibrium where Y u = Y n = 84.62, Bu = Bn = 68.80 and s = 82.25%.
At this pooling equilibrium Uu = 32.38, Un = 33 and both the labor supply and the
consumption of users are lower than for non-users. The labor supply of users is upward
distorted and the labor supply of non-users is downward distorted.39
Numerical example showing the possibility that a distortion arises even though
no self-selection constraint is binding at a second-best optimum. Assume that
the users’ work-related costs are given by the concave function ϕ (h) = 5h + 0.5
√
h.
Furthermore, assume that wu = 12.87, wn = 10, and pi = 1/5. Under laissez-faire we
have that Y uLF = 100.13 and Y
n
LF = (w
n)2 = 100, with UuLF = 29.57 and U
n
LF = 50. As-
sume that in the Pareto efficient tax problem V
n
is set equal to 40.01. At a second-best
optimum we get that Y uSB = 0, so that the labor supply of users is distorted down-
wards, Y nSB = 100 (no distortion on the labor supply of non-users), U
n
SB = 40.01 and
UuSB = 39.96.
40 However, since the utility for a non-user choosing the bundle intended for
38In this case a first-best optimum is implemented and both self-selection constraint are binding:
Uu (Y u, Bu) = Uu (Y n, Bn) and Un (Y n, Bn) = Un (Y u, Bu).
39Setting V
n
= 32.69, one would get the second-best optimum that would be chosen by a max-min
government. At this second-best optimum Y u = Y n = 84.62, Bu = Bn = 68.49, s = 83.85% and
Uu = Un = 32.69. As shown in Appendix E, with Y uLF < Y
n
LF a max-min social welfare function
always deliver a second-best optimum where both self-selection constraints are binding. However, this
second-best optimum is not necessarily a pooling equilibrium as in our example. For instance, assume
that wu = 10.2, wn = 10, q = 5 and pi = 1/5. The max-min optimum would be a separating equilibrium
where Uu < Un.
40We also have BuSB = 39.96 and B
n
SB = 90.01. Notice also that the second-best optimum features
income re-ranking with respect to the laissez-faire equilibrium.
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users would be equal to 39.96, and the utility for a user choosing the bundle intended for
non-users would be equal to 19.58, it follows that no self-selection constraint is binding at
the second-best optimum. Nonetheless, observe that without a self-selection constraint
requiring non-users not to be tempted to mimic users, the latter could have been offered
an undistorted bundle (in our example, the bundle (Y,B) = (100.13, 140.09)).
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